LEADER 05157nam 2200721Ia 450 001 9910490031103321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a0-19-160724-X 010 $a0-19-152595-2 010 $a1-4356-3350-4 010 $a9786611145347 010 $a1-281-14534-3 035 $a(CKB)2560000000294074 035 $a(EBL)679556 035 $a(OCoLC)712015956 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000087030 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11112484 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000087030 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10031073 035 $a(PQKB)11140413 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0000074388 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC679556 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC7036820 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL7036820 035 $a(oapen)https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/70998 035 $a(EXLCZ)992560000000294074 100 $a20070613d2007 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 12$aA game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation /$fDebraj Ray 210 $aOxford $cOxford University Press$d2007 215 $a1 online resource (336 p.) 225 1 $aThe Lipsey lectures 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-19-920795-X 311 $a0-19-170910-7 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aContents; Preface; Chapter 1. Introduction; Part 1 The Setting; Chapter 2. Ingredients for a Theory of Agreements; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Characteristic Functions and Cooperative Games; 2.3 Two Approaches to Coalition Formation; 2.4 Farsightedness; 2.5 Two Examples; 2.6 Negotiations: One-Time or Continuing?; Chapter 3. Coalitions, Cooperation and Noncooperation; 3.1 Definitions and Notation; 3.2 Coalitional Equilibrium; 3.3 Partition Functions; 3.4 Extensions; 3.5 Summary; Part 2 A Bargaining Approach To Coalition Formation; Chapter 4. Irreversible Agreements; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 A Model 327 $a4.3 Equilibrium4.4 Rubinstein-Sta?hl Bargaining; 4.5 Baron-Ferejohn Bargaining; 4.6 Summary; Chapter 5. Irreversible Agreements: Symmetric Games; 5.1 Symmetric Partition Functions; 5.2 An Algorithm; 5.3 Connecting the Algorithm to Equilibria; 5.4 A Remark on Nontransferable Payoffs; 5.5 Proofs; 5.6 Summary; Chapter 6. Applications; 6.1 Cournot Oligopoly; 6.2 Public Goods; 6.3 Proofs; 6.4 Summary; Chapter 7. Irreversible Agreements: The General Case; 7.1 Characteristic Functions and the Core; 7.2 Equilibrium Response Vectors; 7.3 No-Delay Equilibrium 327 $a7.4 Condition M, Payoffs and Coalition Structure7.5 More on Efficiency; 7.6 Externalities Revisited; 7.7 Alternative Protocols; 7.8 Proofs; 7.9 Summary; Chapter 8. A Framework for Reversible Agreements; 8.1 An Example; 8.2 A Proposal-Based Model of Coalition Formation; 8.3 Binding Agreements; 8.4 Strategies and Equilibrium; 8.5 Absorption and Efficiency; 8.6 Summary; Chapter 9. Reversible Agreements Without Externalities; 9.1 Two Examples; 9.2 Benignness; 9.3 Absorption and Efficiency; 9.4 Proofs; 9.5 Summary; Chapter 10. Reversible Agreements With Externalities 327 $a10.1 The Baseline Model for Three-Player Games10.2 The Baseline Model for Four or More Players; 10.3 Superadditive Games; 10.4 Upfront Transfers and the Failure of Efficiency; 10.5 Summary; Part 3 A Blocking Approach to Coalition Formation; Chapter 11. Blocking; 11.1 The Core Revisited; 11.2 Farsightedness in Blocking; 11.3 A First Pass at Farsightedness; 11.4 Externalities and Farsightedness; 11.5 Summary; Chapter 12. Irreversible Commitments; 12.1 Equilibrium Binding Agreements; 12.2 Farsightedness and Prediction; 12.3 Inefficiency; 12.4 An Application to Political Party Formation 327 $a12.5 Beyond Nested Deviations12.6 Summary; Chapter 13. The Blocking Approach in Real Time; 13.1 Introduction; 13.2 An Informal Description; 13.3 A Process of Coalition Formation; 13.4 Deterministic Equilibrium Processes; 13.5 Stochastic Equilibrium Processes; 13.6 Proofs; 13.7 Summary; Chapter 14. Directions; 14.1 Coalition Formation Without Unanimity; 14.2 Equity Within Coalitions; 14.3 Coalition Formation With Deliberate Exit; 14.4 Overlapping Coalitions; 14.5 Networks; 14.6 Coalition Formation With Nonbinding Agreements; 14.7 Incomplete Information; 14.8 Nontransferable Utility 327 $a14.9 Axiomatic Approaches 330 8 $aDrawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. 410 0$aLipsey lectures. 606 $aCoalitions 606 $aGame theory 615 0$aCoalitions. 615 0$aGame theory. 676 $a302.14 676 $a302.14 686 $a83.03$2bcl 700 $aRay$b Debraj$0118374 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910490031103321 996 $aA game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation$92181488 997 $aUNINA