LEADER 03656nam 22005895 450 001 9910484955403321 005 20200919073122.0 010 $a3-658-08615-7 024 7 $a10.1007/978-3-658-08615-2 035 $a(CKB)3710000000332408 035 $a(EBL)1965927 035 $a(OCoLC)908084454 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001424563 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11869049 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001424563 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11369465 035 $a(PQKB)10862365 035 $a(DE-He213)978-3-658-08615-2 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1965927 035 $a(PPN)18351789X 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000332408 100 $a20150109d2015 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aPolitical Preferences and the Aging of Populations $ePolitical-Economy Explanations of Pension Reform /$fby Oliver Pamp 205 $a1st ed. 2015. 210 1$aWiesbaden :$cSpringer Fachmedien Wiesbaden :$cImprint: Springer VS,$d2015. 215 $a1 online resource (201 p.) 300 $a"Research"--Cover. 311 $a3-658-08614-9 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aPopulation Aging and its Economic and Financial Consequences -- Formal Models of Pension Systems -- Pension Preferences and Reform ? A Political-Economy Model -- Econometric Analyses of Cross-National Survey Data on Individual Pension Reform Preferences. 330 $aOliver Pamp analyzes the likelihood and extent of pension reforms from a political-economy perspective. It is shown that voters? preferences for or against reforms are influenced by a societies? demographic development, the generosity of its existing public pension scheme and its electoral system. The author extensively reviews existing formal models of pension systems, discusses their merits and limitations, and develops a three-period overlapping generations model. The model?s insights regarding individual reform preferences are then put into the context of different electoral systems, thus emphasizing the important role of electoral institutions in the aggregation of societal preferences. Finally, using cross-national survey data, logit and ordered-logit analyses tentatively confirm some of the model?s main implications. Contents Population Aging and its Economic and Financial Consequences Formal Models of Pension Systems Pension Preferences and Reform ? A Political-Economy Model Econometric Analyses of Cross-National Survey Data on Individual Pension Reform Preferences Target Groups Researchers, lecturers and students of political science and economics The Author Oliver Pamp is lecturer for empirical and formal methods at the Geschwister Scholl Institute of Political Science at the Ludwig Maximilians University in Munich (Germany). His research focuses, among other things, on the political economy of government budgets and social policy. 606 $aEconomics 606 $aDemography 606 $aInternational Political Economy$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/912140 606 $aDemography$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/X25000 615 0$aEconomics. 615 0$aDemography. 615 14$aInternational Political Economy. 615 24$aDemography. 676 $a300 676 $a304.6 676 $a339.5 700 $aPamp$b Oliver$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut$01226102 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910484955403321 996 $aPolitical Preferences and the Aging of Populations$92846758 997 $aUNINA