LEADER 06417nam 22007335 450 001 9910484769903321 005 20230810225023.0 010 $a94-017-9756-0 024 7 $a10.1007/978-94-017-9756-6 035 $a(CKB)3710000000414436 035 $a(EBL)2096769 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001501470 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11814865 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001501470 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11524508 035 $a(PQKB)10889158 035 $a(DE-He213)978-94-017-9756-6 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC2096769 035 $a(PPN)186030258 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000414436 100 $a20150512d2015 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe Fallacy of Corporate Moral Agency /$fby David Rönnegard 205 $a1st ed. 2015. 210 1$aDordrecht :$cSpringer Netherlands :$cImprint: Springer,$d2015. 215 $a1 online resource (225 p.) 225 1 $aIssues in Business Ethics,$x2215-1680 ;$v44 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a94-017-9755-2 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references at the end of each chapters. 327 $aAbstract; Contents; Introduction; Part I The Fallacy of Corporate Moral Agency; 1 The Importance of Corporate Moral Agency; References; 2 Necessary Conditions for Moral Agency; References; 3 Corporate Intentions; 3.1 Explication of Peter French's Conception of Corporate Moral Agency; 3.2 The Metaphysics of Intentions and Its Moral Relevance; References; 4 Corporate Actions; 4.1 Are Corporate Agents Autonomous?; 4.2 Free vs. Non-free Agents; 4.3 Emergent Corporate Moral Agency?; References; 5 Corporate Autonomy; References; 6 Summary of Why Corporate Moral Agency Is a Fallacy; 6.1 Autonomy 327 $a6.2 Intention6.3 Action; Reference; 7 The Reference of Corporate Proper Names and Responsibility Attributions; References; 8 Corporate Collective Moral Agency; 8.1 Joint/Shared Intentions; 8.2 Group/Corporate Intentions; 8.3 Corporate Collective Intentions; References; 9 Conclusion: Legitimate and Illegitimate Corporate Moral Responsibility Attributions; 9.1 Moral Responsibility Attribution to a Collective Whole; 9.2 Moral Responsibility Attribution to a Corporate Structure; 9.3 Moral Responsibility Attribution to a Unanimously Intending Collective 327 $a9.4 Elliptical Moral Responsibility Attribution to a Collective WholeReferences; Part II The Role of the Corporation in Society; 10 The Role of the Corporation in Society: The Descriptive View; 10.1 The First Corporations; 10.2 The Legal Debate About the Nature of the Corporation; 10.3 The Shareholder Primacy Norm; 10.4 The Separation of the Corporation from the Shareholders and the Emergence of the Corporate Share as an Autonomous Form of Property; 10.5 The Limited Liability of Shareholders 327 $a10.6 The Reification of the Corporation (and the Legal Influence of the Theories About the Nature of the Corporation)10.7 The Corporation as Socio-economic Instrument; References; 11 The Role of the Corporation in Society: The Prescriptive View; 11.1 Ought the Corporate Legal Form to Be Used as an Instrument of the State?; 11.1.1 The Problem with the Descriptive Claims of the Nexus-of-Contracts Theory; 11.1.2 The Problem with the Libertarian Prescription for Absolute Property Rights; 11.2 The Wrong with the Corporate Social ResponsibilityMovement 327 $a11.2.1 The Philosophical Foundations of the CSR Movement11.2.2 Shareholder Theory vs. CSR; 11.2.2.1 The Economic Efficiency of Shareholder Theory vs.Stakeholder Theory; 11.2.2.2 Exogenous vs. Endogenous Corporate Safeguards; 11.2.3 The Rationality of the Shareholder Primacy Norm; 11.3 The Division Between Public and Private Corporate Responsibilities; 11.3.1 The Public/Private Distinction; 11.3.2 The Market as a Zone of Moral Exception; 11.3.3 The Justification for State Regulation; 11.4 Summary: The Role the Corporation Ought to Play in Society; References; Conclusion; Bibliography 330 $aIt is uncontroversial that corporations are legal agents that can be held legally responsible, but can corporations also be moral agents that are morally responsible? Part one of this book explicates the most prominent theories of corporate moral agency and provides a detailed debunking of why corporate moral agency is a fallacy. This implies that talk of corporate moral responsibilities, beyond the mere metaphorical, is essentially meaningless. Part two takes the fallacy of corporate moral agency as its premise and spells out its implications. It shows how prominent normative theories within Corporate Social Responsibility, such as Stakeholder Theory and Social Contract Theory, rest on an implicit assumption of corporate moral agency. In this metaphysical respect such theories are untenable. In order to provide a more robust metaphysical foundation for corporations the book explicates the development of the corporate legal form in the US and UK, which displays how the corporation has come to have its current legal attributes. This historical evolution shows that the corporation is a legal fiction created by the state in order to serve both public and private goals. The normative implication for corporate accountability is that citizens of democratic states ought to primarily make calls for legal enactments in order to hold the corporate legal instruments accountable to their preferences. 410 0$aIssues in Business Ethics,$x2215-1680 ;$v44 606 $aEthics 606 $aEconometrics 606 $aLaw$xPhilosophy 606 $aLaw$xHistory 606 $aMoral Philosophy and Applied Ethics 606 $aQuantitative Economics 606 $aTheories of Law, Philosophy of Law, Legal History 615 0$aEthics. 615 0$aEconometrics. 615 0$aLaw$xPhilosophy. 615 0$aLaw$xHistory. 615 14$aMoral Philosophy and Applied Ethics. 615 24$aQuantitative Economics. 615 24$aTheories of Law, Philosophy of Law, Legal History. 676 $a174.4 700 $aRönnegard$b David$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut$01227321 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910484769903321 996 $aThe Fallacy of Corporate Moral Agency$92849831 997 $aUNINA