LEADER 01212nam--2200385---450- 001 990003322070203316 005 20101201113942.0 010 $a88-710-4091-0 035 $a000332207 035 $aUSA01000332207 035 $a(ALEPH)000332207USA01 035 $a000332207 100 $a20090930d1989----km-y0itay50------ba 101 $aita 102 $aIT 105 $a||||||||001yy 200 1 $aMario Pagano e la scienza penalistica del secolo 19.$fElio Palombi 205 $a2. ed. riv. ed ampliata 210 $aNapoli$cEdizioni scientifiche italiane$d[1989] 215 $a163 p.$d24 cm 600 0 $aPagano,$bMario$xTeorie 676 $a345.00945 700 1$aPALOMBI,$bElio$0437417 801 0$aIT$bsalbc$gISBD 912 $a990003322070203316 951 $aXXII.3.E. 31$b71250 EC$cXXII.3.E. 31$d00164772 951 $aXXII.3.E. 31 a$b71251 EC$cXXII.3.E. 31 a$d00164771 959 $aBK 969 $aGIU 979 $aRSIAV1$b90$c20090930$lUSA01$h1454 979 $aRSIAV1$b90$c20090930$lUSA01$h1459 979 $aRSIAV2$b90$c20101122$lUSA01$h0851 979 $aRSIAV4$b90$c20101201$lUSA01$h1139 996 $aMario Pagano e la scienza penalistica del secolo 19$962878 997 $aUNISA LEADER 03315nam 22006375 450 001 9910483800503321 005 20230810211233.0 010 $a3-642-40900-8 024 7 $a10.1007/978-3-642-40900-4 035 $a(CKB)3710000000251958 035 $a(EBL)1967589 035 $a(OCoLC)893211323 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001372685 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11782336 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001372685 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11310889 035 $a(PQKB)10502243 035 $a(DE-He213)978-3-642-40900-4 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1967589 035 $a(PPN)182097013 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000251958 100 $a20141006d2015 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aLiability Rules in Patent Law $eA Legal and Economic Analysis /$fby Daniel Krauspenhaar 205 $a1st ed. 2015. 210 1$aBerlin, Heidelberg :$cSpringer Berlin Heidelberg :$cImprint: Springer,$d2015. 215 $a1 online resource (251 p.) 225 1 $aMunich Studies on Innovation and Competition,$x2199-7470 ;$v1 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a3-642-40899-0 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aIntroductory Remarks -- Overuse of Exclusivity in Patent Law -- Private Liability Rule Regimes -- Compulsory Liability Rule and Liability Rule by Default Regimes -- Overall View and Conclusion. 330 $aThe primary purpose of a patent law system should be to enhance economic efficiency, in particular by providing incentives for making inventions. The conventional wisdom is that patents should therefore be strictly exclusive rights. Moreover, in practice patent owners are almost never forced to give up their right to exclude others and receive only a certain amount of remuneration with, for instance, compulsory licensing. Other economically interesting patent-law objectives, however, include the transfer and dissemination of knowledge. Mechanisms exist by which the patent owner decides if he or she would prefer exclusive or non-exclusive rights, for instance the  opportunity to declare the willingness to license and create patent pools. But it is questionable whether these mechanisms are sufficient and efficient enough in view of the existence of patent trolls and other problems. This work challenges the conventional wisdom to a certain extent and makes proposals for improvements. 410 0$aMunich Studies on Innovation and Competition,$x2199-7470 ;$v1 606 $aInformation technology$xLaw and legislation 606 $aMass media$xLaw and legislation 606 $aLaw and economics 606 $aIT Law, Media Law, Intellectual Property 606 $aLaw and Economics 615 0$aInformation technology$xLaw and legislation. 615 0$aMass media$xLaw and legislation. 615 0$aLaw and economics. 615 14$aIT Law, Media Law, Intellectual Property. 615 24$aLaw and Economics. 676 $a330 676 $a340 676 $a343099 700 $aKrauspenhaar$b Daniel$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut$01225608 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910483800503321 996 $aLiability Rules in Patent Law$92845576 997 $aUNINA