LEADER 04381nam 22006735 450 001 9910483615203321 005 20200919134235.0 010 $a3-319-22738-6 024 7 $a10.1007/978-3-319-22738-2 035 $a(CKB)3710000000494185 035 $a(EBL)4068124 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001585431 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)16263033 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001585431 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)14864305 035 $a(PQKB)11604444 035 $a(DE-He213)978-3-319-22738-2 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4068124 035 $a(PPN)190527595 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000494185 100 $a20151022d2015 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 12$aA Pluralist Theory of the Mind /$fby David Ludwig 205 $a1st ed. 2015. 210 1$aCham :$cSpringer International Publishing :$cImprint: Springer,$d2015. 215 $a1 online resource (207 p.) 225 1 $aEuropean Studies in Philosophy of Science,$x2365-4228 ;$v2 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a3-319-22737-8 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references at the end of each chapters. 327 $aIntroduction -- Pluralism and Scientific Practice -- Beyond Placement Problems -- A Historical Diagnosis -- Part I In Defense of Conceptual Relativity -- Conceptual Relativity in Philosophy -- Conceptual Relativity in Science -- The Demarcation Problem of Conceptual Relativity -- Part II From Conceptual Relativity to Vertical Pluralism -- The Argument from Horizontal Pluralism -- The Argument from Ontological Non-Fundamentalism -- Part III Beyond the Mind-Body Problem -- Consciousness -- Beyond Dualism and Physicalism -- Mental Causation -- Epilogue: Metaphysics in a Complex World. 330 $aThis book challenges common debates in philosophy of mind by questioning the framework of placement problems in contemporary metaphysics. The author argues that placement problems arise when exactly one fundamental ontology serves as the base for all entities, and will propose a pluralist alternative that takes the diversity of our conceptual resources and ontologies seriously.  This general pluralist account is applied to issues in philosophy of mind to argue that contemporary debates about the mind-body problem are built on this problematic framework of placement problems. The starting point is the plurality of ontologies in scientific practice. Not only can we describe the world in terms of physical, biological, or psychological ontologies, but any serious engagement with scientific ontologies will identify more specific ontologies in each domain. For example, there is not one unified ontology for biology, but rather a diversity of scientific specializations with different ontological needs. Based on this account of scientific practice the author argues that there is no reason to assume that  ontological unification must be possible everywhere. Without this ideal, the scope of ontological unification turns out to be an open empirical question and there is no need to present unification failures as philosophically puzzling ?placement problems?. 410 0$aEuropean Studies in Philosophy of Science,$x2365-4228 ;$v2 606 $aPhilosophy and science 606 $aPhilosophy of mind 606 $aMetaphysics 606 $aBiology?Philosophy 606 $aPhilosophy of Science$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E34000 606 $aPhilosophy of Mind$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E31000 606 $aMetaphysics$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E18000 606 $aPhilosophy of Biology$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E34010 615 0$aPhilosophy and science. 615 0$aPhilosophy of mind. 615 0$aMetaphysics. 615 0$aBiology?Philosophy. 615 14$aPhilosophy of Science. 615 24$aPhilosophy of Mind. 615 24$aMetaphysics. 615 24$aPhilosophy of Biology. 676 $a100 700 $aLudwig$b David$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut$01225665 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910483615203321 996 $aA Pluralist Theory of the Mind$92845708 997 $aUNINA