LEADER 02999 am 2200469 n 450 001 9910324952603321 005 20180809 010 $a2-7535-6322-5 024 7 $a10.4000/books.pur.69056 035 $a(CKB)4100000008351104 035 $a(FrMaCLE)OB-pur-69056 035 $a(oapen)https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/41833 035 $a(PPN)236940910 035 $a(EXLCZ)994100000008351104 100 $a20190603j|||||||| ||| 0 101 0 $afre 135 $auu||||||m|||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aBasculer dans le numérique $eLes mutations du métier de photographe /$fSylvain Maresca 210 $aRennes $cPresses universitaires de Rennes$d2018 215 $a1 online resource (190 p.) 311 $a2-7535-3440-3 330 $aLe numérique a touché de plein fouet les photographes professionnels en modifiant radicalement non seulement leurs outils, mais également leur manière de travailler. En l'espace de vingt ans, ils ont adopté l'informatique, complètement renouvelé leur matériel de prise de vue, modifié leurs façons de réaliser et surtout de finaliser, de transmettre leurs images, dans un contexte général marqué par l'essor d'Internet, source d'une circulation mondialisée des images. Difficile d'imaginer une transformation plus radicale d'un univers professionnel. Ce livre explore les retombées sociales, culturelles, économiques de cette mutation technologique selon une approche délibérément ethnographique, émaillée de bout en bout par des plongées dans des cas singuliers et néanmoins représentatifs, par la restitution des propos de représentants divers de la profession photographique, par des extraits d'articles ou d'interviews parus dans la presse, etc. Le mouvement a beau avoir été général, on découvre ainsi que les réactions des photographes ont été multiples, précoces ou tardives, enthousiastes ou réticentes, convaincues ou dubitatives, révélant une fois de plus combien cette profession était hétérogène. Au-delà de ce milieu professionnel particulier, cette enquête s'est attachée à établir des points de comparaison avec les incidences du numérique dans d'autres professions créatives : cinéma, composition musicale, montage son, graphisme. Ces parallèles inspirent une conclusion sur ce que les transformations de ces professions pourraient bien annoncer dans le reste du monde du travail. 606 $aSociology 606 $anumérique 606 $aphotographe 606 $amutations sociales 610 $aphotographe 610 $anumérique 610 $amutations sociales 615 4$aSociology 615 4$anumérique 615 4$aphotographe 615 4$amutations sociales 700 $aMaresca$b Sylvain$01288042 801 0$bFR-FrMaCLE 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910324952603321 996 $aBasculer dans le numérique$93020623 997 $aUNINA LEADER 08339nam 2200493 450 001 9910483346303321 005 20231110215436.0 010 $a3-030-69575-1 035 $a(CKB)4100000011946069 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC6631132 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL6631132 035 $a(OCoLC)1252844155 035 $a(EXLCZ)994100000011946069 100 $a20220129d2021 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aAuction theory $eintroductory exercises with answer keys /$fPak-Sing Choi, Felix Munoz-Garcia 210 1$aCham, Switzerland :$cSpringer,$d[2021] 210 4$d©2021 215 $a1 online resource (304 pages) 225 1 $aSpringer Texts in Business and Economics 311 $a3-030-69574-3 327 $aIntro -- Preface -- Organization of the Book -- How to Use This Book -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- 1 Second-Price Auctions -- Introduction -- Exercise #1.1: Second-Price Auction with Complete InformationA -- Exercise #1.2: Second-Price Auctions Under Incomplete InformationB -- Exercise #1.3: Second-Price Auctions Under Incomplete Information and Discrete ValuationsB -- Exercise #1.4: Robustness of Equilibrium Bidding in the Second-Price AuctionA -- Exercise #1.5: Efficiency in Second-Price AuctionsA -- Exercise #1.6: Bidding Behavior in the English AuctionA -- Exercise #1.7: Expected Revenue in the Second-Price AuctionC -- Exercise #1.8: Second-Price Auctions with Reservation PricesA -- Exercise #1.9: Second-Price Auctions with Entry FeesB -- Exercise #1.10: Asymmetric Bidding Equilibria in the Second-Price AuctionB -- Exercise #1.11: Collusion in Second-Price Auctions, Based on GrahamandMarshall1987A -- Exercise #1.12: Second-Price Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders, Based on CheandGale1998B -- 2 First-Price Auctions -- Introduction -- Exercise #2.1: First-Price Auction Under Complete InformationA -- Exercise #2.2: First-Price Auction with Only Two Bidders and Uniformly Distributed ValuationsA -- Exercise #2.3: First-Price Auction with N?2 Bidders and Uniformly Distributed ValuationsA -- Exercise #2.4: First-Price Auction with Generic Distribution of Valuations-The Direct ApproachB -- Exercise #2.5: First-Price Auction with Uniformly or Exponentially Distributed ValuesB -- Exercise #2.6: First-Price Auction with Generic Distribution of Valuations-The Envelope Theorem ApproachC -- Exercise #2.7: Efficiency in First-Price AuctionsA -- Exercise #2.8: The First-Order StatisticB -- Exercise #2.9: The Second-Order StatisticB -- Exercise #2.10: The kth-Order StatisticC -- Exercise #2.11: Bidding Behavior in the Dutch AuctionA. 327 $a3 First-Price Auctions: Extensions -- Introduction -- Exercise #3.1: Expected Revenue in the First-Price Auction-Direct ProofB -- Exercise #3.2: Expected Revenue in the First-Price Auction-Proof Using the First-Order StatisticC -- Exercise #3.3: Expected Payment in the First-Price AuctionB -- Exercise #3.4: First-Price Auction with Risk-Averse Bidders-An IntroductionA -- Exercise #3.5: First-Price Auction with Risk-Averse Bidders-General SettingB -- Exercise #3.6: Efficiency with Risk AversionA -- Exercise #3.7: First-Price Auction with Asymmetrically Distributed ValuationsB -- Exercise #3.8: Sequential Version of the First-Price AuctionA -- Exercise #3.9: First-Price Auctions with Reservation Prices-One BidderA -- Exercise #3.10: First-Price Auctions with Reservation Prices-Several BiddersC -- Exercise #3.11: First-Price Auction with Entry FeesC -- Exercise #3.12: First-Price Auction with Discrete ValuationsB -- Exercise #3.13: Collusion in First-Price Auctions, Based on McAfeeandMcMillan1992B -- Exercise #3.14: First-Price Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders, Based on CheandGale1998B -- 4 All-Pay Auctions and Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders -- Introduction -- Exercise #4.1: All-Pay Auction Under Complete Information, Based on Bayeetal1996B -- Exercise #4.2: Testing a Bidding Function in a First-Price, All-Pay AuctionA -- Exercise #4.3: Finding the Equilibrium Bidding Function in the First-Price All-Pay Auction Using the Envelope Theorem ApproachC -- Exercise #4.4: Finding the Equilibrium Bidding Function in the First-Price All-Pay Auction Using the Direct ApproachB -- Exercise #4.5: Efficiency in All-Pay AuctionsA -- Exercise #4.6: Finding the Expected Revenue in the First-Price All-Pay AuctionB -- Exercise #4.7: Finding Equilibrium Bids in the Second-Price All-Pay AuctionB -- Exercise #4.8: War of AttritionA. 327 $aExercise #4.9: Asymmetrically Informed Risk-Neutral Bidders, Based on KimandChe2014B -- Exercise #4.10: Asymmetrically Informed Risk-Averse Bidders, Based on OrozcoAlemanandMunozGarcia2011B -- 5 Third-Price Auctions, kth-Price Auctions, and Lotteries -- Introduction -- Exercise #5.1: Third-Price Auction, A Numerical ExampleA -- Exercise #5.2: Finding the Equilibrium Bidding Function in a Third-Price AuctionC -- Exercise #5.3: Equilibrium Bidding Function in a Third-Price Auction with Uniformly or Exponentially Distributed ValuesB -- Exercise #5.4: kth-Price AuctionC -- Exercise #5.5: Efficiency in kth-Price AuctionsA -- Exercise #5.6: Lottery Auction, An IntroductionA -- Exercise #5.7: Lottery Auction, A More General ApproachB -- Exercise #5.8: Efficiency in Lottery AuctionsA -- 6 The Revenue Equivalence Principle -- Introduction -- Exercise #6.1: Revenue Comparison in Four Auction FormatsA -- Exercise #6.2: Revenue Comparison Between First- and Second-Price AuctionsB -- Exercise #6.3: The Revenue Equivalence Principle with Risk Averse BiddersA -- Exercise #6.4: The Revenue Equivalence Principle with Risk Averse SellersB -- Exercise #6.5: Revenue Equivalence Theorem-Short ProofB -- Exercise #6.6: Revenue Equivalence Theorem-Longer ProofC -- 7 Common-Value Auctions -- Introduction -- Exercise #7.1: The Winner's Curse in Common-Value Auctions-IntroductionA -- Exercise #7.2: Equilibrium Bidding in Common-Value Auctions with Two BiddersB -- Exercise #7.3: Equilibrium Bidding in Common-Value Auctions with N?2 BiddersC -- Exercise #7.4: First-Price Auction When Bidders Have Interdependent ValuesB -- Exercise #7.5: Second-Price Auction When Bidders have Interdependent ValuesB -- Exercise #7.6: Revenue Comparison in Auctions When Bidders Have Interdependent ValuesB -- 8 Multi-Unit Auctions -- Introduction. 327 $aExercise #8.1: First-Price Auction Selling Multiple Units (Discriminatory Auction)A -- Exercise #8.2: Second-Price Auction Selling Multiple Units (Uniform-Price Auction)A -- Exercise #8.3: Second-Price Auction Selling Multiple Units, Allowing for Different PricesB -- Exercise #8.4: Divide Bidders and Conquer in a First-Price AuctionB -- Exercise #8.5: Divide Bidders and Conquer in a Second-Price AuctionA -- 9 Mechanism Design -- Introduction -- Exercise #9.1: Incentives to Truthfully Reveal ValuationsA -- Exercise #9.2: First-Price Auction as a Direct Revelation MechanismB -- Exercise #9.3: Second-Price Auction as a Direct Revelation Mechanism A -- Exercise #9.4: VCG Mechanism Selling a Single UnitB -- Exercise #9.5: VCG Mechanism Selling Several UnitsB -- Exercise #9.6: VCG Mechanism and the Generalized Second-Price AuctionB -- 10 Procurement Auctions -- Introduction -- Exercise #10.1: Procurement Auctions Under Complete InformationA -- Exercise #10.2: Procurement Auctions Under Incomplete InformationB -- Exercise #10.3: Procurement Auctions with External Effects, Based on Choietal2018 C -- Exercise #10.4: Procurement Auctions with Perfect MonitoringB -- Exercise #10.5: Procurement Auctions with Imperfect MonitoringC -- A Game Theory Appendix -- Background -- Dominated Strategies -- Nash Equilibrium -- Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium -- Subgame Perfect Equilibrium -- Bayesian Nash Equilibrium -- References -- Index. 410 0$aSpringer Texts in Business and Economics 606 $aAuctions 606 $aAuction theory 615 0$aAuctions. 615 0$aAuction theory. 676 $a381.17 700 $aChoi$b Pak-Sing$0847333 702 $aMun?oz-Garcia$b Felix 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910483346303321 996 $aAuction theory$92586224 997 $aUNINA