LEADER 04295nam 22007815 450 001 9910483253203321 005 20230810184125.0 010 $a3-319-13114-1 024 7 $a10.1007/978-3-319-13114-6 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1966864 035 $a(DE-He213)978-3-319-13114-6 035 $a(PPN)183092341 035 $a(CKB)3710000000291562 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000291562 100 $a20141121d2015 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aContracts of Adhesion Between Law and Economics $eRethinking the Unconscionability Doctrine /$fby Elena D'Agostino 205 $a1st ed. 2015. 210 1$aCham :$cSpringer International Publishing :$cImprint: Springer,$d2015. 215 $a1 online resource (84 p.) 225 1 $aSpringerBriefs in Law,$x2192-8568 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a3-319-13113-3 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $a1. The Unconscionability Doctrine in a Law & Economics Perspective -- 2. Market structure -- 3. Lack of sophistication -- 4. Voluntary Disclosure of Clauses -- 5. Public Intervention -- 6. Concluding remarks. 330 $aThis book examines the most controversial issues concerning the use of pre-drafted clauses in fine print, which are usually included in consumer contracts and presented to consumers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. By applying a multi-disciplinary approach that combines consumer?s psychology and seller?s drafting power in the logic of efficiency and good faith, the book provides a fresh and unconventional analysis of the existing literature, both theoretical and empirical. Moving from the unconscionability doctrine, it criticizes (and in some cases refutes) its main conclusions based on criteria which are usually invoked to sustain the need for public intervention to protect consumers, and specifically related to Law (contract complexity), Psychology (consumer lack of sophistication criterion) and Economics (market structure criterion). It also analyzes the effects of different regulations, such as banning vexatious clauses or mandating disclosure clauses, showing that none of them protect consumers, but in fact prove to be harmful when consumers are more vulnerable, that is whenever sellers can exploit some degree of market power. In closing, the book combines these disparate aspects, arguing that the solution (if any) to the problem of consumer exploitation and market inefficiency associated with the use of contracts of adhesion in these contexts cannot be found in removing or prohibiting hidden clauses, but instead has to take into account the effects of these clauses on the contract as a whole. 410 0$aSpringerBriefs in Law,$x2192-8568 606 $aLaw$xPhilosophy 606 $aLaw$xHistory 606 $aLaw and economics 606 $aInternational law 606 $aTrade regulation 606 $aLaw$xEurope 606 $aPrivate international law 606 $aConflict of laws 606 $aComparative law 606 $aTheories of Law, Philosophy of Law, Legal History 606 $aLaw and Economics 606 $aInternational Economic Law, Trade Law 606 $aEuropean Law 606 $aPrivate International Law, International and Foreign Law, Comparative Law 615 0$aLaw$xPhilosophy. 615 0$aLaw$xHistory. 615 0$aLaw and economics. 615 0$aInternational law. 615 0$aTrade regulation. 615 0$aLaw$xEurope. 615 0$aPrivate international law. 615 0$aConflict of laws. 615 0$aComparative law. 615 14$aTheories of Law, Philosophy of Law, Legal History. 615 24$aLaw and Economics. 615 24$aInternational Economic Law, Trade Law. 615 24$aEuropean Law. 615 24$aPrivate International Law, International and Foreign Law, Comparative Law. 676 $a346.402 700 $aD'Agostino$b Elena$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut$01228459 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910483253203321 996 $aContracts of Adhesion Between Law and Economics$92851890 997 $aUNINA