LEADER 04038nam 22005775 450 001 9910483086103321 005 20200919150123.0 010 $a3-319-18902-6 024 7 $a10.1007/978-3-319-18902-4 035 $a(CKB)3710000000444385 035 $a(EBL)3567566 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001534778 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11876125 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001534778 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11513909 035 $a(PQKB)10240457 035 $a(DE-He213)978-3-319-18902-4 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3567566 035 $a(PPN)187689903 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000444385 100 $a20150706d2015 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aModest Nonconceptualism $eEpistemology, Phenomenology, and Content /$fby Eva Schmidt 205 $a1st ed. 2015. 210 1$aCham :$cSpringer International Publishing :$cImprint: Springer,$d2015. 215 $a1 online resource (275 p.) 225 1 $aStudies in Brain and Mind,$x1573-4536 ;$v8 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a3-319-18901-8 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $a1 Introduction -- 2 Content, Concepts, Concept Possession -- 3 Nonconceptual Content -- 4 Arguments from Phenomenology -- 5 The Argument from Contradictory Contents -- 6 Arguments from Concept Possession -- 7 The Epistemological Objection -- 8 The Objection from Objectivity -- 9 Modest Nonconceptualism Vindicated. 330 $aThe author defends nonconceptualism, the claim that perceptual experience is nonconceptual and has nonconceptual content. Continuing the heated and complex debate surrounding this topic over the past two decades, she offers a sustained defense of a novel version of the view, Modest Nonconceptualism, and provides a systematic overview of some of the central controversies in the debate. The volume starts off with an explication of the notion of nonconceptual content and a distinction between nonconceptualist views of different strengths, then the author goes on to defend participants in the debate over nonconceptual content against the allegation that their failure to distinguish between a state view and a content view of (non)conceptualism leads to fatal problems for their views. Next, she makes a case for nonconceptualism by refining some of the central arguments for the view, such as the arguments from fineness of grain, from contradictory contents, from animal and infant perception, and from concept acquisition. Then, two central objections against nonconceptualism are rebutted in a novel way: the epistemological objection and the objection from objectivity. Modest Nonconceptualism allows for perceptual experiences to involve some conceptual elements. It emphasizes the relevance of concept employment for an understanding of conceptual and nonconceptual mental states and identifies the nonconceptual content of experience with scenario content. It insists on the possibility of genuine content-bearing perceptual experience without concept possession and is thus in line with the Autonomy Thesis. Finally, it includes an account of perceptual justification that relies on the external contents of experience and belief, yet is compatible with epistemological internalism. 410 0$aStudies in Brain and Mind,$x1573-4536 ;$v8 606 $aPhilosophy of mind 606 $aEpistemology 606 $aPhilosophy of Mind$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E31000 606 $aEpistemology$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E13000 615 0$aPhilosophy of mind. 615 0$aEpistemology. 615 14$aPhilosophy of Mind. 615 24$aEpistemology. 676 $a100 700 $aSchmidt$b Eva$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut$0213741 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910483086103321 996 $aModest Nonconceptualism$92848527 997 $aUNINA