LEADER 04255nam 22007095 450 001 9910482988403321 005 20200920052216.0 010 $a3-319-17623-4 024 7 $a10.1007/978-3-319-17623-9 035 $a(CKB)3710000000394743 035 $a(EBL)2095460 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001501603 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11901924 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001501603 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11446779 035 $a(PQKB)11516744 035 $a(DE-He213)978-3-319-17623-9 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC2095460 035 $a(PPN)185486983 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000394743 100 $a20150411d2015 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aMind in Action $eExperience and Embodied Cognition in Pragmatism /$fby Pentti Määttänen 205 $a1st ed. 2015. 210 1$aCham :$cSpringer International Publishing :$cImprint: Springer,$d2015. 215 $a1 online resource (102 p.) 225 1 $aStudies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics,$x2192-6255 ;$v18 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a3-319-17622-6 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references at the end of each chapters and index. 327 $aIntroduction: Challenging Classical Dichotomies -- Philosophical Naturalism -- Experience and the Object of Knowledge -- Habit of Action -- Habits as Meanings -- Mind and Interaction -- Facts and Values in Pragmatism -- Mind in Action and the Problem of Realism. 330 $aThe book questions two key dichotomies: that of the apparent and real, and that of the internal and external. This leads to revised notions of the structure of experience and the object of knowledge. Our world is experienced as possibilities of action, and to know is to know what to do. A further consequence is that the mind is best considered as a property of organisms? interactions with their environment. The unit of analysis is the loop of action and perception, and the central concept is the notion of habit of action, which provides the embodied basis of cognition as the anticipation of action. This holds for non-linguistic tacit meanings as well as for linguistic meanings. Habit of action is a teleological notion and thus opens a possibility for defining intentionality and normativity in terms of the soft naturalism adopted in the book. The mind is embodied, and this embodiment determines our physical perspective on the world. Our sensory organs and other instruments give us instrumental access to the world, and this access is epistemic in character. The distinction between the physical and conceptual viewpoint allows us to define truth as the correspondence with operational fit. This embodied epistemic truth is however not a sign of antirealism, as the instrumentally accessed theoretical objects are precisely those objects that experimental science deals with.  . 410 0$aStudies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics,$x2192-6255 ;$v18 606 $aEpistemology 606 $aArtificial intelligence 606 $aCognitive psychology 606 $aPhilosophy and science 606 $aEpistemology$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E13000 606 $aArtificial Intelligence$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/I21000 606 $aCognitive Psychology$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/Y20060 606 $aPhilosophy of Science$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E34000 615 0$aEpistemology. 615 0$aArtificial intelligence. 615 0$aCognitive psychology. 615 0$aPhilosophy and science. 615 14$aEpistemology. 615 24$aArtificial Intelligence. 615 24$aCognitive Psychology. 615 24$aPhilosophy of Science. 676 $a144.3 700 $aMäättänen$b Pentti$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut$0454031 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910482988403321 996 $aMind in Action$92846263 997 $aUNINA