LEADER 05485nam 22005775 450 001 9910479903203321 005 20210806032738.0 010 $a981-4818-64-X 024 7 $a10.1355/9789814818643 035 $a(CKB)4100000005879081 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC5492942 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9789814818643 035 $a(OCoLC)1091646214 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse71638 035 $a(DE-B1597)522112 035 $a(OCoLC)1049912756 035 $a(DE-B1597)9789814818643 035 $a(EXLCZ)994100000005879081 100 $a20190430d2018 fg 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 15$aThe "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" and Implications for ASEAN /$fJohn Lee 210 1$aSingapore :$cISEAS Publishing,$d[2018] 210 4$dİ2018 215 $a1 online resource (43 pages) 225 1 $aTrends in Southeast Asia,$x0219-3213 ;$v2018, no. 13 300 $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 20 Feb 2019). 311 0 $a981-4818-63-1 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $tFront matter --$tFOREWORD --$tThe "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" and Implications for ASEAN --$tThe "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" and Implications for ASEAN --$tCONCLUSION 330 $aIn recent times, the United States, Japan and Australia have all promoted extremely similar visions of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific as the central organizing concept to guide their efforts in the region. The concept is essentially a reaffirmation of the security and economic rules-based order which was cobbled together after the Second World War - especially as it relates to freedom of the regional and global commons such as sea, air and cyberspace, and the way nations conduct economic relations. Be that as it may, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific is an updated vision of collective action to defend, strengthen and advance that order. It signals a greater acceptance by the two regional allies of the U.S. of their security burden and takes into account the realities of China's rise and the relative decline in dominance of the U.S. There are a number of noteworthy "updates" which include: ? A deliberate move from "Asia-Pacific" to "Indo-Pacific" as the primary geo-strategic and geo-economic area of interest and responsibility for the three countries; ? An increased emphasis on creating and sustaining a "balance of power" in favour of the rules-based order; and ? A greater emphasis on the liberal aspects of a preferred order including the importance of rule-of-law and limitations on how governments wield their power, and greater separation of political and strategic objectives on one hand with commercial activities on the other. While operationalization of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept is at an early stage, trilateral strategic cooperation between the U.S., Japan and Australia is significant and quickly deepening. On the other hand, and with respect to misalignment and inconsistency, the economic policies of the Trump administration are causing considerable frustration. The three countries have also been strong supporters for the revival of the Quadrilateral grouping which also includes India. However, and notwithstanding some apprehension in Southeast Asia, about where the "Quad" is heading, the latter grouping is only still a fledgling one and its shape and development will depend on the extent to which the four countries become concerned about China's activities in both Oceans. Finally, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member states continue to delay any definitive response to the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept. Although its principles are attractive to many ASEAN member states, long-held conceptions of ASEAN centrality and its meaning gives the organization apparent reason for hesitation. The reasons include fears of diminished centrality and relevance, and reluctance to endorse a more confrontational mindset being adopted by the U.S. and its allies - including the revival of the Quadrilateral grouping with India - with respect to China. The reality is that while ASEAN and major member states are focused primarily on the risks of action, there are considerable risks of inaction and hesitation. The current era will either enhance or lessen the relevance of ASEAN in the eyes of these three countries in the years ahead depending on how the organisation and its key member states respond. Indeed, the paper argues that ASEAN is more likely to be left behind by strategic events and developments if it remains passive, and that the ball is in ASEAN's court in terms of the future of its regional "centrality". 410 0$aTrends in Southeast Asia ;$v2018, no. 13. 606 $aInternational Economics 607 $aIndo-Pacific Region$xStrategic aspects 607 $aSoutheast Asia$xForeign relations$zIndo-Pacific Region 607 $aIndo-Pacific Region$xForeign relations$zSoutheast Asia 607 $aIndo-Pacific Region$xPolitics and government 607 $aSoutheast Asia$xEconomic conditions 608 $aElectronic books. 615 4$aInternational Economics. 676 $a330.0973 700 $aLee$b John$0364392 801 0$bDE-B1597 801 1$bDE-B1597 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910479903203321 996 $aThe "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" and Implications for ASEAN$92478054 997 $aUNINA