LEADER 03066nam 2200601 450 001 9910467149503321 005 20200917021826.0 010 $a3-11-047446-8 010 $a3-11-047468-9 024 7 $a10.1515/9783110474688 035 $a(CKB)3850000000000641 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4742107 035 $a(DE-B1597)463881 035 $a(OCoLC)979746427 035 $a(DE-B1597)9783110474688 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL4742107 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11297983 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL970143 035 $a(OCoLC)958411210 035 $a(EXLCZ)993850000000000641 100 $a20161124h20162016 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $2rdacontent 182 $2rdamedia 183 $2rdacarrier 200 10$aFree will, causality and the self /$fAtle Ottesen Sovik 210 1$aBerlin, [Germany] ;$aBoston, [Massachusetts] :$cDe Gruyter,$d2016. 210 4$d©2016 215 $a1 online resource (192 pages) 225 1 $aPhilosophical Analysis,$x2198-2066 ;$vVolume 71 311 $a3-11-061174-0 311 $a3-11-047431-X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and indexes. 327 $tFrontmatter -- $tForeword -- $tContents -- $t1. Introduction -- $t2. Causality -- $t3. The Self -- $t4. Free Will -- $t5. Answers to Objections -- $tBibliography -- $tName index -- $tSubject index 330 $aA major goal for compatibilists is to avoid the luck problem and to include all the facts from neuroscience and natural science in general which purportedly show that the brain works in a law-governed and causal way like any other part of nature. Libertarians, for their part, want to avoid the manipulation argument and demonstrate that very common and deep seated convictions about freedom and responsibility are true: it can really be fundamentally up to us as agents to determine that the future should be either A or B. This book presents a theory of free will which integrates the main motivations of compatibilists and libertarians, while at the same time avoiding their problems. The so-called event-causal libertarianism is the libertarian account closest to compatibilitsm, as it claims there is indeterminism in the mind of an agent. The charge of compatibilists, however, is that this position is impaired by the problem of luck. This book is unique in arguing that free will in a strong sense of the term does not require indeterminism in the brain, only indeterminism somewhere in the world which there plausibly is. 410 0$aPhilosophische Analyse ;$vVolume 71. 606 $aFree will and determinism 606 $aCausation 606 $aSelf (Philosophy) 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aFree will and determinism. 615 0$aCausation. 615 0$aSelf (Philosophy) 676 $a123.5 700 $aSøvik$b Atle Ottesen$0909140 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910467149503321 996 $aFree will, causality and the self$92463794 997 $aUNINA