LEADER 05505nam 2200697Ia 450 001 9910465489803321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a9786612052545 010 $a0-19-152508-1 010 $a1-282-05254-3 010 $a0-19-877472-9 035 $a(CKB)2560000000293849 035 $a(EBL)716700 035 $a(OCoLC)370749842 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000086741 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11119370 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000086741 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10054786 035 $a(PQKB)10037997 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0000074225 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC716700 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL716700 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10288248 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL205254 035 $a(EXLCZ)992560000000293849 100 $a19961108d1996 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aEvolution, games, and economic behaviour$b[electronic resource] /$fFernando Vega-Redondo 210 $aOxford ;$aNew York $cOxford University Press$d1996 215 $a1 online resource (222 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-19-877473-7 311 $a0-19-159697-3 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [201]-206) and index. 327 $aContents; 1 Introduction; 1.1 What is an Evolutionary Model; 1.2 Why Evolutionary Models?; 1.3 The Plan of What Follows; 2 Static Analysis; 2.1 Theoretical Framework; 2.1.1 Basic model; 2.1.2 Alternative scenarios: "Playing the Field" or "Pairwise Contests"; 2.2 Evolutionarily Stable Strategy; 2.2.1 General definition; 2.2.2 Alternative interpretations of ESS: monomorphic vs. polymorphic populations; 2.3 Examples; 2.3.1 Pairwise contests: the Hawk- Dove game; 2.3.2 Playing the field: the Sex-Ratio game; 2.4 ESS and Refinements of Nash Equilibrium; 2.5 The Existence of an ESS 327 $a2.6 Asymmetric Contests2.6.1 Introduction; 2.6.2 Ex ante symmetry with ex post asymmetries; 2.6.3 Example: the Hawk- Dove game revisited (I); 2.6.4 Extensive-form contests; 2.7 ESS and Finite Populations; 2.7.1 The "spite" of an ESS; 2.7.2 An example of oligopolistic competition; 2.8 Evolution and Cheap Talk; 3 Basic Dynamic Analysis; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 The Replicator Dynamics; 3.2.1 The discrete-time case; 3.2.2 The continuous-time case; 3.2.3 Properties of the Replicator Dynamics; 3.3 The ESS and the Replicator Dynamics; 3.3.1 The implicit dynamics of a monomorphic ESS 327 $a3.3.2 ESS conditions and polymorphic stability3.4 Evolutionary Dynamics and Nash Refinements; 3.5 Some Examples; 3.5.1 The Hawk- Dove game revisited (II); 3.5.2 The Rock-Scissors-Paper game; 3.6 Replicator Dynamics in Mixed Strategies; 3.6.1 The model; 3.6.2 ESS conditions and dynamic evolutionary stability; 3.7 Permanence and Survival; 3.7.1 Definitions; 3.7.2 Necessary conditions for persistence and permanence; 3.7.3 Sufficient conditions for permanence; 3.7.4 Average behaviour in permanent systems; 3.8 Population Genetics; 3.9 The Prisoner's Dilemma; 3.9.1 Basic (unperturbed) model 327 $a3.9.2 Noisy dynamics3.10 Pollination and Reward: An Example; 3.10.1 Preliminaries; 3.10.2 The model; 4 Evolution in Social Environments; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Theoretical Framework; 4.3 Evolutionary Growth Dynamics; 4.3.1 The model; 4.3.2 Monotonicity properties; 4.3.3 Some examples; 4.4 Dynamics of Monotonic Evolutionary Systems; 4.4.1 Dynamic stability and Nash equilibrium; 4.4.2 Set stability; 4.4.3 Long-run regularities; 4.5 Evolution and Rationality; 4.5.1 Evolution and pay-off dominance; 4.5.2 Evolution, iterative dominance, and rationalizability; 4.6 General Evolutionary Processes 327 $a4.6.1 Gradient monotonicity4.6.2 Dynamic stability and rationality; 4.7 Examples; 4.7.1 Trading complementarities; 4.7.2 Risky trading; 4.8 A Simplified Ultimatum Game; 4.9 A Hierarchic Model of Cultural Evolution; 5 Stochastic Evolution; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 A Simple Example; 5.3 Theoretical Framework; 5.4 Analysis; 5.4.1 Large matching noise; 5.4.2 Small matching noise; 5.4.3 On the role of noise in evolutionary models; 5.4.4 Extensions; 5.5 Continuous-Time Dynamics; 5.6 Rate of Convergence and Interaction Pattern; 5.6.1 Global interaction; 5.6.2 Local interaction 327 $a5.7 The Evolution of Walrasian Behaviour 330 $aThis textbook for advanced undergraduate and postgraduate students of Evolutionary Game Theory covers recent developments in the field, with an emphasis on economic contexts and applications. It begins with the basic ideas as they originated within the field of theoretical biology and then proceeds to the formulation of a theoretical framework that is suitable for the study of social and economic phenomena from an evolutionary perspective. Core topics include the EvolutionaryStable Strategy (EES) and Replicator Dynamics (RD), deterministic dynamic models, and stochastic perturbations. A set of 606 $aGame theory 606 $aEvolutionary economics 606 $aEquilibrium (Economics) 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aGame theory. 615 0$aEvolutionary economics. 615 0$aEquilibrium (Economics) 676 $a519.3 700 $aVega-Redondo$b Fernando$0140846 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910465489803321 996 $aEvolution, games, and economic behaviour$9500718 997 $aUNINA