LEADER 03749nam 22006015 450 001 9910465093903321 005 20210330010412.0 010 $a0-8014-6837-X 010 $a0-8014-6838-8 024 7 $a10.7591/9780801468384 035 $a(CKB)2560000000101872 035 $a(OCoLC)849921500 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10704788 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001035793 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11671589 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001035793 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11033476 035 $a(PQKB)10030284 035 $a(DE-B1597)481695 035 $a(OCoLC)987938830 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780801468384 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3138481 035 $a(EXLCZ)992560000000101872 100 $a20170517d2013 fg 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||#|||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 00$aInadvertent Escalation $eConventional War and Nuclear Risks /$fBarry R. Posen 210 1$aIthaca, N.Y. :$cCornell University Press,$d[2013] 210 4$dİ1991 215 $a1 online resource (295 p.) 225 0 $aCornell Studies in Security Affairs 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a1-322-50403-2 311 $a0-8014-7885-5 327 $tFront matter --$tContents --$tTables --$tFigures --$tPreface --$t1. Introduction: A Model of Inadvertent Escalation --$t2. Air War and Inadvertent Nuclear Escalation --$t3. The Balance of Ground Forces on the Central Front --$t4. Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank --$t5. "Offensive" and "Defensive" Sea Control: A Comparative Assessment --$t6. Conclusion --$tAPPENDIX 1. The Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) Model --$tAPPENDIX 2. Central Region Close Air Support Aircraft and Attack Helicopters (1988) --$tAPPENDIX 3. The Attrition-FEBA Expansion Model: Symphony Version --$tAPPENDIX 4. A Barrier Defense Model --$tSelected Bibliography --$tIndex 330 $aIn this sobering book, Barry R. Posen demonstrates how the interplay between conventional military operations and nuclear forces could, in conflicts among states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, inadvertently produce pressures for nuclear escalation. Knowledge of these hidden pressures, he believes, may help some future decision maker avoid catastrophe. Building a formidable argument that moves with cumulative force, he details the way in which escalation could occur not by mindless accident, or by deliberate preference for nuclear escalation, but rather as a natural accompaniment of land, naval, or air warfare at the conventional level. Posen bases his analysis on an empirical study of the east-west military competition in Europe during the 1980's, using a conceptual framework drawn from international relations theory, organization theory, and strategic theory. The lessons of his book, however, go well beyond the east-west competition. Since his observations are relevant to all military competitions between states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, his book speaks to some of the problems that attend the proliferation of nuclear weapons in longstanding regional conflicts. Optimism that small and medium nuclear powers can easily achieve "stable" nuclear balances is, he believes, unwarranted. 606 $aEscalation (Military science) 606 $aNuclear threshold (Strategy) 606 $aLimited war 615 0$aEscalation (Military science) 615 0$aNuclear threshold (Strategy) 615 0$aLimited war 676 $a355.02/15 700 $aPosen$b Barry R.$01042255 801 0$bDE-B1597 801 1$bDE-B1597 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910465093903321 996 $aInadvertent Escalation$92466350 997 $aUNINA LEADER 00897cam0-22003131i-450 001 990004839740403321 005 20230622101256.0 035 $a000483974 035 $aFED01000483974 035 $a(Aleph)000483974FED01 100 $a19990604g19651972km-y0itay50------ba 101 0 $aeng 102 $aGB 105 $af-------001yy 200 1 $aCollected Letters$fBernard Shaw$gedited by Dan H. Laurence 210 $aLondon$cReinhardt$d1965-1972 215 $av., tav.$cill.$d24 cm 327 0 $a1.: 1874-1897$a2.: 1898-1910 676 $a826 700 1$aShaw,$bBernard$f<1856-1950>$0322209 702 1$aLaurence,$bDan H. 801 0$aIT$bUNINA$gRICA$2UNIMARC 901 $aBK 912 $a990004839740403321 952 $aQ 25 49 (1)$bFil. Mod. 22619$fFLFBC 952 $aQ 25 49 (2)$bFil. Mod. 22619$fFLFBC 959 $aFLFBC 996 $aCollected letters$9480054 997 $aUNINA