LEADER 05812nam 2200757 450 001 9910464946803321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a0-19-997712-7 010 $a0-19-025849-7 010 $a0-19-982959-4 035 $a(CKB)3710000000072879 035 $a(EBL)948483 035 $a(OCoLC)865508310 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001039200 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11702380 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001039200 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11057738 035 $a(PQKB)10277782 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0001077839 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC948483 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL948483 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10816689 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL550686 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000072879 100 $a20131219d2012 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aToo much is not enough $eincentives in executive compensation /$fRobert W. Kolb 210 1$aOxford, England :$cOxford University Press,$d2012. 210 4$dİ2012 215 $a1 online resource (225 p.) 225 0$aFinancial Management Association survey and synthesis series 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-19-982958-6 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aCover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Dedication; Contents; Preface; 1. The Magnitude and Structure of Executive Compensation; The Magnitude of CEO Compensation; The Structure of Executive Compensation; Salary; Bonuses and Long-Term Incentive Plans; Restricted Stock Awards; Executive Stock Option (ESO) Awards; Other Forms of Compensation; 2. Corporate Governance, Agency Problems, and Executive Compensation; Corporate Governance; Agency Theory and Incentive Alignment; Corporate Governance, Incentive Alignment, and the Managerial Power Hypothesis; The Levers of Managerial Power 327 $aLimits to Pay in the Managerial Power HypothesisAssessing the Conceptual Conflict Between the Agency-Theoretic and Managerial Power Views of Executive Compensation; What About Ethics, Duty, and Justice?; Fiduciary Duty; Executive Compensation and Distributive Justice; 3. The Incentive Structure of Executive Compensation; The Incentive Revolution and Executive Compensation; Salary; Bonuses; Restricted Stock and Performance Shares; Executive Stock Options; Equity Compensation: Retaining the Employees You Have and Attracting the Ones You Want 327 $aDifferent Instruments as Tools of Incentive Compensation4. Executive Stock Options and the Incentives They Create; ESO Incentives, Firm Practices, and the Effect of Accounting Rules; Option Pricing Models; Option Valuation Effects of Individual Option Parameters; The Option Pricing Model and Incentives; Executive Stock Option Design, Management, and Incentives; What Exercise Price?; Repricing and Reloading Executive Stock Options; The CEO's Utility and the Desire for ESOs; 5. Executive Stock Option Design, Management, and Incentives; CEO Wealth, Pay, and Performance; Exercise of ESOs 327 $aUnwinding Incentives6. Executive Incentives and Risk Taking; Equity Compensation and the CEO's Risk Appetite; Executive Compensation and the Risk-Taking Behavior of CEOs; Incentive Compensation, Risk Taking, and the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009; 7. Incentive Compensation and the Management of the Firm; Incentive Compensation and the Firm's Investment Program; CEO Incentives and the Firm's Financing Decisions; Compensation Incentives, Dividends, and Share Repurchases; Corporate Mergers, Acquisitions, and Liquidations; Compensation Incentives and Corporate Risk Management 327 $aCompensation Incentives and Corporate Disclosures8. Perverse Incentive Effects: Executives Behaving Badly; Earnings Management; Option Games and Exploitation; Option Games: A Warning About Incentives in Executive Compensation; 9. Incentives in Executive Compensation: A Final Assessment; Incentive Compensation and the Level of Executive Pay; New Legislation and the Shaping of Incentives; How Dysfunctional Is Executive Pay?; On Balance, Is Incentive Compensation Beneficial?; To Improve Executive Compensation, Improve Corporate Governance 327 $aExecutive Pay, Continuing Inequality, and the Question of Justice 330 $aThe scholarly literature on executive compensation is vast. As such, this literature provides an unparalleled resource for studying the interaction between the setting of incentives (or the attempted setting of incentives) and the behavior that is actually adduced. From this literature, there are several reasons for believing that one can set incentives in executive compensation with a high rate of success in guiding CEO behavior, and one might expect CEO compensation to be a textbook example of the successful use of incentives. Also, as executive compensation has been studied intensively in t 410 0$aFinancial Management Association Survey and Synthesis Series 606 $aExecutives$xSalaries, etc$zUnited States 606 $aIncentives in industry$zUnited States 606 $aIncentive awards$zUnited States 606 $aCorporate governance$zUnited States 606 $aExecutives$xSalaries, etc$xGovernment policy$zUnited States 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aExecutives$xSalaries, etc. 615 0$aIncentives in industry 615 0$aIncentive awards 615 0$aCorporate governance 615 0$aExecutives$xSalaries, etc.$xGovernment policy 676 $a331.2/164 700 $aKolb$b Robert W.$f1949-$0891740 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910464946803321 996 $aToo much is not enough$92240146 997 $aUNINA