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010   $a1-4527-0241-1
010   $a9786613821782
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035   $a(EBL)3014487
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035   $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000940715
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100   $a20061103d2006      uf             0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|n|---|||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aWhat transparency can do when incentives fail$b[electronic resource] $ean analysis of rent capture /$fprepared by Era Dabla-Norris and Elisabeth Paul
210   $aWashington, D.C. $cInternational Monetary Fund, Middle East and Central Asia Dept.$dc2006
215   $a1 online resource (35 p.)
225 1 $aIMF working paper ;$vWP/06/146
300   $a"June 2006."
311   $a1-4518-6406-X 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references.
327   $a""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. A STYLIZED MODEL""; ""III. RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS""; ""IV. THE ROLE OF TRANSPARENCY""; ""V. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES""
410  0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/06/146.
606   $aCorruption$zDeveloping countries$xPrevention$xEconometric models
606   $aRent (Economic theory)$xEconometric models
606   $aTransparency in government$xEconometric models
608   $aElectronic books.
615  0$aCorruption$xPrevention$xEconometric models.
615  0$aRent (Economic theory)$xEconometric models.
615  0$aTransparency in government$xEconometric models.
700   $aDabla-Norris$b Era$0864455
701   $aPaul$b Elisabeth$0907258
712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund.$bMiddle East and Central Asia Dept.
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910464571703321
996   $aWhat transparency can do when incentives fail$92029698
997   $aUNINA