LEADER 03294nam 2200613Ia 450 001 9910464257703321 005 20170815101926.0 010 $a1-4623-4468-2 010 $a1-4527-9245-3 010 $a1-282-84281-1 010 $a9786612842818 010 $a1-4518-7207-0 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055205 035 $a(EBL)1608181 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000943279 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11550394 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943279 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10975478 035 $a(PQKB)10955211 035 $a(OCoLC)469142141 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1608181 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055205 100 $a20100902d2009 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aTargeting social transfers to the poor in Mexico$b[electronic resource] /$fDavid Coady and Susan Parker 210 $a[Washington, D.C.] $cInternational Monetary Fund$d2009 215 $a1 online resource (32 p.) 225 1 $aIMF working paper ;$vWP/09/60 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4519-1642-6 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aContents; I. Introduction; II. Program and Data Description; Program Description; Tables; 1. Variables and Weights Used to Estimate the Discriminant Proxy-Means Score; Data Description; 2. Transfer Levels by Grade and Gender (pesos per month, 2002); III. Methodology; IV. Results; Figures; 1. Unconditional Probabilities; Targeting Performance Across Participation Stages; 2. Conditional Probabilities; 3. Targeting Performance by Stage; 4. Share of Targeting Performance by Stage; 5. Share of Targeting Performance by Stage; Policy Reform Simulations 327 $a3. Trade-off Between Vertical Targeting Performance and Program CoverageV. Summary; Appendix; Details of Simulations Estimating Targeting Implications of Universal Knowledge; Appendix Tables; 1. Results for Conditional Application and Acceptance Outcomes and Consumption Model; 2. Application Outcomes Under Universal Knowledge; References 330 $aMexico's main social support program, Oportunidades, combines two methods to target cash to poor households: an initial self-selection by households who acquire knowledge about the program and apply for benefits, followed by an administrative determination of eligibility based on a means test. Self-selection improves targeting by excluding high-income households, while administrative targeting does so mainly by excluding middle-income households. The two methods are complementary: expanding program knowledge across households substantially increases applications from non-poor households, thus 410 0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/09/60. 606 $aPublic welfare$zMexico 606 $aSocial service$zMexico 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aPublic welfare 615 0$aSocial service 700 $aCoady$b David$0629944 701 $aParker$b Susan$0941360 712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund. 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910464257703321 996 $aTargeting social transfers to the poor in Mexico$92123262 997 $aUNINA