LEADER 04378nam 2200637Ia 450 001 9910464236403321 005 20170821160745.0 010 $a1-4623-0936-4 010 $a1-4527-1173-9 010 $a1-4518-7169-4 010 $a1-282-84244-7 010 $a9786612842443 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055183 035 $a(EBL)1608141 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000942129 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11543355 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000942129 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10971846 035 $a(PQKB)10921618 035 $a(OCoLC)465418354 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1608141 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055183 100 $a20041202d2009 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aMonetary and fiscal rules in an emerging small open economy$b[electronic resource] /$fprepared by Nicoletta Batini, Paul Levine, and Joseph Pearlman 210 $a[Washington D.C.] $cInternational Monetary Fund$d2009 215 $a1 online resource (80 p.) 225 1 $aIMF working paper ;$vWP/09/22 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4519-1605-1 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aContents; I. Introduction; II. The Model; A. Households; B. Firms; C. The Government Budget Constraint and Foreign Asset Accumulation; D. The Equilibrium; E. Specialization of the Household's Utility Function; F. State Space Representation; G. The Small Open Economy; H. Calibration; III. Monetary Policy Interest Rate Rules; IV. Fiscal Rules; A. A Conventional Fiscal Rule; B. The Structural Fiscal Surplus Rule; V. Imposing the Nominal Interest Rate Zero Lower Bound; VI. Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy with Financial Frictions; A. Imposing the ZLB; Figures; 1. Imposition of ZLB: Model I 327 $a2. Imposition of ZLB: Model IIIB. Welfare Decomposition; C. Impulse Responses; 3. Impulse Responses to a-1 Percent Technology Shock. Models I, II, and III; VII. The Performance of Optimized Simple Rules; 4. Imposition of ZLB: Flex(D)+Conventional Fiscal Rule, Model I; 5. Imposition of ZLB: Flex(D)+Conventional Fiscal Rule: Model III; VIII. Conclusions; Tables; 1. Notation for Prices; 2. Welfare Outcomes Under Optimal Policy: No ZLB Constraint; 3. Optimal Policy with a ZLB Constraint: Monetary Policy Only for Model I 327 $a4. Optimal Commitment with a ZLB Constraint. Monetary Plus Fiscal Policy for Model I5. Welfare Outcomes Under Optimal Policy: ZLB Constraint; 6. Welfare Decomposition of Shocks; 7. Welfare Outcomes Under Optimized Simple Rules: FLEX (D) with a Conventional Fiscal Rule. Models I, II and III; 8. Welfare Outcomes Under Optimized Simple Rules: FIX with a Conventional Fiscal Rule. Models I, II and III; 9. Welfare Outcomes Under Optimized Simple Rules: FLEX(C) with a Conventional Fiscal Rule. Models I, II and III 327 $a10. Welfare Outcomes Under Optimized Simple Rules: FLEX(D) with a Modified SFSR. Models I, II and IIIAppendixes; 1. The Steady State; 2. Linearization; 3. Calibration and Estimation; 4. Quadratic Approximation of the Welfare Loss 330 $aWe develop a optimal rules-based interpretation of the 'three pillars macroeconomic policy framework': a combination of a freely floating exchange rate, an explicit target for inflation, and a mechanism than ensures a stable government debt-GDP ratio around a specified long run. We show how such monetary-fiscal rules need to be adjusted to accommodate specific features of emerging market economies. The model takes the form of two-blocs, a DSGE emerging small open economy interacting with the rest of the world and features, in particular, financial frictions It is calibrated using Chile and US 410 0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/09/22. 606 $aMonetary policy$zDeveloping countries 606 $aFiscal policy$zDeveloping countries 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aMonetary policy 615 0$aFiscal policy 700 $aBatini$b Nicoletta$0880348 701 $aLevine$b Paul$0127428 701 $aPearlman$b Joseph$0991077 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910464236403321 996 $aMonetary and fiscal rules in an emerging small open economy$92267944 997 $aUNINA