LEADER 03630nam 2200589Ia 450 001 9910464074903321 005 20181115033129.0 010 $a1-4623-3761-9 010 $a1-4527-0265-9 010 $a1-4518-7239-9 010 $a9786612843129 010 $a1-282-84312-5 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055245 035 $a(EBL)1608248 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000939936 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11518972 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000939936 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10946353 035 $a(PQKB)10894123 035 $a(OCoLC)586041473 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1608248 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055245 100 $a20041202d2009 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe size of government and U.S.-European differences in economic performance$b[electronic resource] /$fprepared by Gerwin Bell and Norikazu Tawara 210 $a[Washington D.C.] $cInternational Monetary Fund$d2009 215 $a1 online resource (53 p.) 225 1 $aIMF working paper ;$vWP/09/92 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4519-1674-4 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aContents; I. Introduction; II. The Basic Model; Tables; 1. GDP Level Accounting relative to the U.S; III. The Economic Effects of Government; A. The Base Case; B. The Welfare Effect of Government in International Perspective; Figures; 1. Key Parameters of the Baseline Model by Country, 1970-2001; C. Assessing the Fit of the Model; 2. Incremental Welfare Improvement for Different Tax Policies; D. Different Preference Structures; 3. Goodness of Fit over the Period 1970-99; IV. A Role for Efficiency-Enhancing Government; A. Frictions in the Labor Market; 4. Goodness of Fit of the Friction Model 327 $aB. Labor Market Frictions, Productivity, and Policy 2. Calibrated Vacancy Cost and Match Productivity (1990-99); 3. Bivariate Relations between Labor Market Policies and Efficiency; 5. OLS Regression of Labor Market Efficiency Indicators and Policies; V. Concluding Remarks; References; Appendices; I. Labor Supply in Balanced Growth Models; II. Analysis of Welfare Effects of Different Government Size; III. Introducing Risk Aversion and Capital; IV. Calibrating Labor Market Search Frictions for European Countries Using a Search Model 330 $aAn influential strand of recent research has claimed that large governments in European countries explain their weaker long-term economic performance compared to the U.S. On the other hand, despite these alleged costs, large governments have been popular with electorates. This paper seeks to shed light on this apparent inconsistency; it confirms an adverse effect of taxes on labor supply, but also finds evidence of efficiency-increasing government intervention. However, and especially in the core ""Rhineland-model"" European countries, actual government policies often depart from such efficient 410 0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/09/92. 606 $aEconomic development$xPolitical aspects 606 $aEconomic stabilization$xEconometric models 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aEconomic development$xPolitical aspects. 615 0$aEconomic stabilization$xEconometric models. 700 $aBell$b Gerwin$0992881 701 $aTawara$b Norikazu$0992882 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910464074903321 996 $aThe size of government and U.S.-European differences in economic performance$92273602 997 $aUNINA