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010   $a1-4623-4770-3
010   $a1-4527-2585-3
010   $a9786612843082
010   $a1-282-84308-7
010   $a1-4518-7235-6
035   $a(CKB)3170000000055235
035   $a(EBL)1608236
035   $a(SSID)ssj0000940086
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035   $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000940086
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100   $a20041202d2009      uf             0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|n|---|||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aChile's structural fiscal surplus rule$b[electronic resource] $ea model-based evaluation /$fprepared by Michael Kumhof and Douglas Laxton
210   $a[Washington D.C.] $cInternational Monetary Fund$d2009
215   $a1 online resource (56 p.)
225 1 $aIMF working paper ;$vWP/09/88
300   $aDescription based upon print version of record.
311   $a1-4519-1670-1 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references.
327   $aContents; I. Introduction; II. The Model; Figures; 1. Goods and Factor Flows in GIMF; A. Overlapping Generations Households; B. Liquidity Constrained Households; C. Manufacturers; D. Copper Producers; E. Unions; F. Import Agents; G. Distributors; H. Retailers; I. Government; J. Equilibrium and Balance of Payments; III. Calibration; IV. Choice of Countercyclical Coefficients; Tables; 1. Fiscal Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Volatility; 2. Policy Efficiency Frontiers; V. Choice of Surplus Target; 3. SFS Rule - Survey; 4. SFS Rule - Fiscal Accounts; 5. Balanced Budget Rule - Survey
327   $a6. Balanced Budget Rule - Fiscal Accounts7. Aggressive Countercyclical Rule - Survey; 8. Aggressive Countercyclical Rule - Fiscal Accounts; 9. Surplus Target Shock - Survey; 10. Surplus Target Shock - Fiscal; VI. Summary; References; Appendices; 1. Population Growth; 2. Optimality Conditions for OLG Households; 3. Consumption and Wealth; 4. Optimality for Manufacturing Firms
330   $aThe paper analyzes Chile's structural balance fiscal rule in the face of copper price shocks originating in foreign copper demand. It uses a version of the IMF's Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model (GIMF) that includes a copper sector. Two results are obtained. First, Chile's current fiscal rule performs well if the policymaker puts a small weight on output volatility (relative to inflation volatility) in his/her objective function. A more aggressive countercyclical fiscal rule can attain lower output volatility, but there is a trade-off with (somewhat) higher inflation volatility and 
410  0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/09/88.
606   $aFiscal policy$zChile
606   $aFinance, Public$zChile
608   $aElectronic books.
615  0$aFiscal policy
615  0$aFinance, Public
700   $aKumhof$b Michael$0866240
701   $aLaxton$b Douglas$0860295
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910464068503321
996   $aChile's structural fiscal surplus rule$92060006
997   $aUNINA