LEADER 03939nam 2200625Ia 450 001 9910464064003321 005 20181027005712.0 010 $a1-4623-4871-8 010 $a1-4527-4099-2 010 $a1-282-84257-9 010 $a1-4518-7182-1 010 $a9786612842573 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055195 035 $a(EBL)1608160 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000939945 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11600607 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000939945 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10939160 035 $a(PQKB)11115895 035 $a(OCoLC)469097850 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1608160 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055195 100 $a20041202d2009 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe volatility costs of procyclical lending standards$b[electronic resource] $ean assessment using a DSGE model /$fprepared by Bertrand Gruss and Silvia Sgherri 210 $a[Washington D.C.] $cInternational Monetary Fund$d2009 215 $a1 online resource (39 p.) 225 1 $aIMF working paper ;$vWP/09/35 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4519-1618-3 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aContents; I. Introduction; II. Empirical Evidence; III. The Model; A. Home economy; B. Foreign economy; C. Shocks; D. Equilibrium and solution method; IV. Calibration; V. Policy experiment: altering the cyclical pattern of lending standards; A. Benchmark leverage level; B. Alternative leverage levels; VI. Sensitivity analysis; VII. Conclusions; Appendix; References; Tables; 1. Results from Estimating an AR(1) Processes to Demeaned LTVs; 2. Benchmark Calibration; Figures; 1. Time Variation in Loan-To-Value Ratios; 2. Share of Output Variation Explained by Credit and Asset Price Shocks 327 $a3. Degree of Cyclicality in Credit Innovations 4. Procyclicality in Credit Innovations and Sensitivity of Credit to Asset Price Shocks; 5. Procyclicality in Credit Innovations and Macroeconomic Volatility; 6. Increasing Reliance of Emerging Europe on Foreign Funding; 7. Concentration of Emerging Europe Exposure to Western Europe; 3. Business Cycle Moments from Simulated Series under Benchmark Calibration; 4. Policy Exercise Results (Average LTV = 0.4); 5. Policy Exercise Results (Average LTV = 0.7); 8. IRFs to a Negative Productivity Shock under Alternative Leverage Levels 327 $a9. IRFs to a Negative Shock to Lending Standards under Alternative Leverage Levels10. Sensitivity of Volatility to Different Degrees of Cyclicality in Lending Standards Under Alternative Leverage Levels; 6. Sensitivity Analysis 330 $aThe ongoing financial turmoil has triggered a lively debate on ways of containing systemic risk and lessening the likelihood of boom-and-bust episodes in credit markets. Particularly, it has been argued that banking regulation might attenuate procyclicality in lending standards by affecting the behavior of banks' capital buffers. This paper uses a two-country DSGE model with financial frictions to illustrate how procyclicality in borrowing limits reinforces the "overreaction" of asset prices to shocks described by Aiyagari and Gertler (1999), and to quantify the stabilization gains from policies 410 0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/09/35. 606 $aCredit control$xMathematical models 606 $aLoans$xStandards$xMathematical models 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aCredit control$xMathematical models. 615 0$aLoans$xStandards$xMathematical models. 676 $a338.9669 700 $aGruss$b Bertrand$0864450 701 $aSgherri$b Silvia$0864451 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910464064003321 996 $aThe volatility costs of procyclical lending standards$91929421 997 $aUNINA