LEADER 03653nam 2200685 450 001 9910464018703321 005 20170817212619.0 010 $a1-4623-4268-X 010 $a1-4527-9751-X 010 $a9786612840623 010 $a1-282-84062-2 010 $a1-4518-6968-1 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055000 035 $a(EBL)1607837 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000943051 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11593661 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943051 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10974773 035 $a(PQKB)10657397 035 $a(OCoLC)815735892 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1607837 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055000 100 $a20140227h20082008 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aReserve requirements, the maturity structure of debt, and bank runs /$fEza Al-Zein ; authorized for distribution by Marc Quintyn 210 1$a[Washington, District of Columbia] :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2008. 210 4$dİ2008 215 $a1 online resource (28 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 225 0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/08/108 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4519-1422-9 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aContents; I. Introduction; II. Motivation and Literature; III. The Model; A. The Domestic Economy; B. Date-Specific and Maturity-Specific Reserve Requirements; C. The Lenders' Problem; D. Defining the Equilibrium; Figures; 1. Structure of the Model; IV. The Emergence of Bank Runs; A. The Emergence of Bank Runs in the Setup Without Reserve Requirements; Defining the Illiquidity Condition; 2. Decision Tree at t=1 Summarizes How a Bank Run Would Occur.; B. Can Reserve Requirements Prevent the Occurrence of a Bank Run?; Illiquidity Conditions with Reserve Requirements 327 $aReserve Requirements and Market FailureC. International Lending After the Bank Runs: Are International Lenders "Throwing Good Money After Bad Money"?; International Re-Optimization Problem; V. Discussion; Sunspot and Bank Run Probability; Incentive to Form a Bank; VI. Conclusion; Appendix; References 330 $aThe paper looks at the relationship between reserve requirements and the choice of the maturity structure of external debt in a general equilibrium setup, by incorporating the role of international lenders. A date- and maturity-specific reserve requirement is a fraction of the debt to be deposited in a non-interest bearing account at the central bank. At maturity, the central bank returns the reserves. There exist some specific combinations of date- and maturity-specific reserve requirements that reduce the vulnerability to bank runs. In such setup, lenders may still want to provide new short- 410 0$aIMF Working Papers 606 $aBank reserves$xEconometric models 606 $aBanks and banking, Central$xEconometric models 606 $aBank failures$xEconometric models 606 $aDebts, Public$xEconometric models 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aBank reserves$xEconometric models. 615 0$aBanks and banking, Central$xEconometric models. 615 0$aBank failures$xEconometric models. 615 0$aDebts, Public$xEconometric models. 676 $a332.15 700 $aAl-Zein$b Eza$0979717 701 $aQuintyn$b Marc$0247373 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910464018703321 996 $aReserve requirements, the maturity structure of debt, and bank runs$92234363 997 $aUNINA