LEADER 03708nam 2200673 450 001 9910464010203321 005 20170817212540.0 010 $a1-4623-0535-0 010 $a1-4527-9953-9 010 $a1-4518-6967-3 010 $a9786612840616 010 $a1-282-84061-4 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055015 035 $a(EBL)1607851 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000944006 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11501262 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000944006 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10982725 035 $a(PQKB)11579526 035 $a(OCoLC)815741252 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1607851 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055015 100 $a20140225h20082008 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aCredit booms and lending standards $eevidence from the subprime mortgage market /$fGiovanni Dell'Ariccia, Deniz Igan, and Luc Laeven 210 1$a[Washington, District of Columbia] :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2008. 210 4$dİ2008 215 $a1 online resource (39 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 225 0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/08/106 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4519-1421-0 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aContents; I. Introduction; II. Related Literature; III. Data and Descriptive Statistics; IV. Empirical Methodology; V. Empirical Findings; A. Effects of Changes in the Pool of Applicant Borrowers; B. Identification and Robustness Issues; C. Sensitivity Analysis: Time and Size Effects; D. Effects of Entry and Changes in Market Structure; E. Alternative Proxies for Lending Standards; F. Effects of Loan Sales; VI. Discussion and Conclusions; References; Tables; 1. Coverage in HMDA; 2. Definitions and Sources of Variables; 3. Summary Statistics; 4. Evolution of Denial Rates 327 $a5. Determinants of Denial Decision6. Prediction Errors; 7. Robustness; 8. Time and Size Effects; 9. Market and Boom Size; 10. Market Entry and Denial Rates of Incumbents in Prime and Subprime Markets; 11. Alternative Measures of Lending Standards; 12. Securitization, Lending Standards, and Mortgage Market Expansion; Figures; 1. House Prices and Credit Booms; 2. Subprime Mortgage Boom Across the Nation; 3. House Prices and Credit Boom; 4. Lending Standards and Subprime Credit Boom 330 $aThis paper links the current sub-prime mortgage crisis to a decline in lending standards associated with the rapid expansion of this market. We show that lending standards declined more in areas that experienced larger credit booms and house price increases. We also find that the underlying market structure mattered, with entry of new, large lenders triggering declines in lending standards by incumbent banks. Finally, lending standards declined more in areas with higher mortgage securitization rates. The results are consistent with theoretical predictions from recent financial accelerator mode 410 0$aIMF Working Papers 606 $aCredit$zUnited States 606 $aCredit$zUnited States$xEconometric models 606 $aMoral hazard$zUnited States$xEconometric models 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aCredit 615 0$aCredit$xEconometric models. 615 0$aMoral hazard$xEconometric models. 676 $a332.70973 700 $aDell'Ariccia$b Giovanni$0283573 701 $aIgan$b Deniz$0873077 701 $aLaeven$b Luc$0887526 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910464010203321 996 $aCredit booms and lending standards$92273590 997 $aUNINA