LEADER 03455nam 2200649 450 001 9910464007003321 005 20170821155855.0 010 $a1-4623-6690-2 010 $a1-4527-0267-5 010 $a1-4518-6957-6 010 $a1-282-84051-7 010 $a9786612840517 035 $a(CKB)3170000000054995 035 $a(EBL)1607825 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000943964 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11523999 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943964 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10983189 035 $a(PQKB)11180517 035 $a(OCoLC)874176086 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1607825 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000054995 100 $a20140227h20082008 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aAccumulating foreign reserves under floating exchange rates /$fFernando M. Gonc?alves 210 1$aStuttgart, Germany :$cW. Kohlhammer GmbH,$d2008. 210 4$d©2008 215 $a1 online resource (43 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 225 0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/08/96 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4519-1411-3 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aContents; 1. Introduction; 2. Theoretical Model: Basic Set-up; 3. Complete Information; 3.1. Centralization; 3.2. Institutional Arrangements in Practice; 3.3. Separation; 3.4. Centralization versus Separation; 4. Incomplete Information; 4.1. Stage 1: Centralization versus Separation; Figures; 1. Timetable; 4.2. Stage 0: Centralization versus Separation; 5. Comparative Analysis Under Incomplete Information; 5.1. Simulation of Stage 0 Parameters; 2. Simulation of Stage 0 Parameters; 5.2. The Trade-off Between Reserve Accumulation and Credibility Building; 5.3. Centralization versus Separation 327 $a5.3.1. Macroeconomic Stability3. Macroeconomic Stability - Centralization versus Separation; 5.3.2. Reserve Targeting; 4. Reserve Targeting - Centralization versus Separation; 5.3.3. Discussion; 6. Concluding Remarks; References; Appendix; Proof of Proposition 1; Proof of Corollary 1 330 $aOfficial accumulation of foreign reserves may be perceived as interventions to influence the exchange rate, undermining the credibility of floating exchange rates and inflation targets. This paper develops a theoretical framework to study the interaction between reserve accumulation and monetary policy. The model uncovers a trade-off between the speed of reserve accumulation and anti-inflationary credibility. Under reasonable assumptions, delegation of intervention and monetary policy decisions to separate government agencies allows faster reserve accumulation, while centralization of these de 410 0$aIMF Working Papers 606 $aForeign exchange rates$xEconometric models 606 $aBank reserves$xEconometric models 606 $aMonetary policy$xEconometric models 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aForeign exchange rates$xEconometric models. 615 0$aBank reserves$xEconometric models. 615 0$aMonetary policy$xEconometric models. 676 $a332.456 700 $aGonc?alves$b Fernando M$0862010 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910464007003321 996 $aAccumulating foreign reserves under floating exchange rates$91924031 997 $aUNINA