LEADER 03414nam 2200685Ia 450 001 9910464006703321 005 20170817212528.0 010 $a1-4623-6484-5 010 $a1-4527-7428-5 010 $a1-4518-7320-4 010 $a1-282-84385-0 010 $a9786612843853 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055320 035 $a(EBL)1608396 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000940100 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11512681 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000940100 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10939142 035 $a(PQKB)11774405 035 $a(OCoLC)712987784 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1608396 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055320 100 $a20100720d2009 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aCounterparty risk, impact on collateral flows, and role for central counterparties$b[electronic resource] /$fprepared by Manmohan Singh and James Aitken 210 $a[Washington, D.C.] $cInternational Monetary Fund$dc2009 215 $a1 online resource (17 p.) 225 1 $aIMF working paper ;$vWP/09/173 300 $aAt head of title: Monetary and Capital Markets Department. 300 $a"August 2009." 311 $a1-4519-1747-3 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aContents; I. Introduction; II. Counterparty Risk; Figures; 1. Illustrative Repricing of Derivatives When a Large Financial Institution Fails; III. The Changing Profile of Counterparty Risk in the United States; IV. The Adverse Impact of Counterparty Risk on Global Liquidity; 2. Counterparty Liabilities of Major U.S. Banks; Tables; 1. Snapshot of Reduced Collateral Posting Among LCFIs; 2. Securities Lending by Major Custodians; V. Regulatory Thrust for a Central Counterparty; 3. Cash Holding by Major LCFIs; VI. Conclusions and Policy Implications; Appendixes 327 $a1. Methodological Issues in Computing Connectedness in Counterparty RiskReferences 330 $aCounterparty risk in the United States stemming from exposures to OTC derivatives payables (after netting) is now concentrated in five banks?Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, Bank of America, Morgan Stanley and Citi. This note analyzes how such risks have shifted over the past year. We estimate that the adverse impact of counterparty risk on high-grade collateral flows and global liquidity due to decrease in rehypothecation, reduced securities lending, and hoarding of cash by major banks is at least 5 trillion. In order to mitigate counterparty risk, there have been regulatory initiatives to establish 410 0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/09/173. 606 $aCredit$xRisk assessment 606 $aRisk management$zUnited States 606 $aBanks and banking$zUnited States 606 $aFinance$zUnited States 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aCredit$xRisk assessment. 615 0$aRisk management 615 0$aBanks and banking 615 0$aFinance 676 $a332.63232 700 $aSingh$b Manmohan$f1964-$0971070 701 $aAitken$b James$0191524 712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund.$bMonetary and Capital Markets Dept. 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910464006703321 996 $aCounterparty risk, impact on collateral flows, and role for central counterparties$92292179 997 $aUNINA LEADER 01263nam0 22002891i 450 001 UON00072952 005 20231205102357.972 010 $a18-575-3058-6 100 $a20020107d1992 |0itac50 ba 101 $aeng 102 $aGB 105 $a|||| ||||| 200 1 $aWater and instability in the Middle East$e[An analysis of environmental, economic and political factors influencing water management and water disputes in the Jordan and Nile basins and Tigris-Euphrates region]$fNatasha Beschorner 210 $aLondon$cBrassey's$d1992 215 $a82 p.$d22 cm 410 1$1001UON00066467$12001 $aAdelphi paper$v273 606 $aACQUE$xMedio Oriente$3UONC021959$2FI 620 $aGB$dLondon$3UONL003044 676 $a333.339$cPROPRIETA' E CONTROLLO DELLE RISORSE NATURALI$v21 700 1$aBESCHORNER$bNatasha$3UONV047020$0658948 712 $aBrassey's$3UONV257002$4650 801 $aIT$bSOL$c20240220$gRICA 899 $aSIBA - SISTEMA BIBLIOTECARIO DI ATENEO$2UONSI 912 $aUON00072952 950 $aSIBA - SISTEMA BIBLIOTECARIO DI ATENEO$dSI VO Afr XII 028 $eSI AA 16979 5 028 996 $aWater and instability in the Middle East$91165247 997 $aUNIOR