LEADER 04074nam 2200649 450 001 9910464006203321 005 20170821160802.0 010 $a1-4623-5075-5 010 $a1-4518-6952-5 010 $a1-282-84046-0 010 $a1-4519-8325-5 010 $a9786612840463 035 $a(CKB)3170000000054997 035 $a(EBL)1605809 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000944002 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11503137 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000944002 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10978597 035 $a(PQKB)11111811 035 $a(OCoLC)276785726 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1605809 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000054997 100 $a20140227h20082008 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aCorporate governance reforms in the EU $edo they matter and how? /$fIryna Ivaschenko and Petya Koeva Brooks 210 1$a[Washington, District of Columbia] :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2008. 210 4$dİ2008 215 $a1 online resource (31 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 225 0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/08/91 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4519-1406-7 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aContents; I. Introduction; II. National and EU Corporate Governance Reforms; A. National Reforms; B. EU Reforms; III. Measuring the Private Value of Control; IV. Data and Methodology; A. Data Sample and Descriptive Statistics; B. Empirical Strategy; V. Main Findings; A. Voting Premiums Across Time and Countries; B. Have Reforms Reduced the Private Benefits of Control?; C. Have Reforms Brought About Convergence in Corporate Control?; VI. Conclusions; References; Tables; 1. Italy: National Corporate Reform; 2. Germany: National Corporate Governance Reforms 327 $a3. France: National Corporate Governance Reforms4. EU Corporate Governance Reforms; 5. Number of Dual-Class Firms by Country; 6. Voting Premium: Summary Statistics; 7. Voting Premiums Year Effects; 8. Voting Premium Distributed Year Effects; 9. Relative Effectiveness of Reforms in C3 Compared to the EU and Non-EU Peers, by Year; 10. Relative Effectiveness of Reforms Compared to Control Groups: A Summary; 11. Voting Premiums: Year Effects, Accounting for Product Market Reforms 327 $a12. Relative Effectiveness of Reforms in C3 Compared to the EU and Non-EU Peers, Accounting for Product Market Reforms, by Year13. Distribution Characteristics of Voting Premiums, Pooled for All EU Countries; Figures; 1. Dynamic of the Voting Premiums Acorss Countries, 1992-2007; 2. Reform Efforts: Number of Important Corporate Governance Reforms Per Year; 3. Number of National and EU Corporate Governance Reforms; 4. Convergence in Voting Premiums Across Countries; 5. Distribution of Voting Premium Across EU Countries, by Year 330 $aThis paper proposes a new approach to quantifying the effects of corporate governance reforms, by focusing on the dynamics of the voting premiums, a measure of the private benefits of control in a corporation. The results indicate that the reforms have been successful in reducing the voting premiums EU-wide. Moreover, more intense and broad reform efforts (such as introducing national reforms beyond and above the EU-wide initiatives) bring higher and longer lasting benefits. Our findings also suggest that the market for corporate control in Europe has become more integrated, as illustrated by 410 0$aIMF Working Papers 606 $aCorporate governance$zEurope$vCase studies 606 $aCorporate governance 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aCorporate governance 615 0$aCorporate governance. 676 $a338.6094 700 $aIvaschenko$b Iryna$0862008 701 $aKoeva Brooks$b Petya$0862009 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910464006203321 996 $aCorporate governance reforms in the EU$91924030 997 $aUNINA