LEADER 03347nam 2200637 450 001 9910464004803321 005 20170816134630.0 010 $a1-4623-9313-6 010 $a1-4527-4101-8 010 $a1-282-84043-6 010 $a1-4518-6943-6 010 $a9786612840432 035 $a(CKB)3170000000054993 035 $a(EBL)1607818 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000943984 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11518467 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943984 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10982472 035 $a(PQKB)11537082 035 $a(OCoLC)646904430 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1607818 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000054993 100 $a20140227h20082008 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aBreaking the impediments to budgetary reforms $eevidence from Europe /$fStefania Fabrizio and Ashoka Mody 210 1$a[Washington, District of Columbia] :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2008. 210 4$dİ2008 215 $a1 online resource (33 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 225 0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/08/82 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4519-1397-4 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aContents; I. Introduction; II. Data and Empirical Approach; III. The Setting: War of Attrition; IV. Economic Shocks and Crises; V. Credibility: Does It Take Nixon To Go To China?; VI. Conclusions; Appendices; I. Quality of Budget Institutions; Appendix Tables; 1. Construction of the Index: Fiscal Institutions and Their Index Parameters; 2. Index of Quality of Budget Institutions; 3. Fiscal Institutions' Quality Index; II. Definitions and Sources of Variables Used in Regression Analysis; Tables; 1. War of Attrition; 2. Political Constraints; 3. Economic Shocks; 4. Crises and Reforms 327 $a5. Credibility6. Model Predictions; Figures; 1. Average Value of Fiscal Institutions' Index, 1991-2004; 2. Quality of Fiscal Institutions' Index and Per Capita Income; 3. Fiscal Institutions' Index; 4. Interaction of Primary Balance and Fractionalization; 5. Nonlinear Effects in the Full Model; References 330 $aUnder what conditions are budget institutions likely to be strengthened? We find that fiscal deficits do not help in focusing policymakers on undertaking reforms. To the contrary, the larger the deficit, the lower is the likelihood of reforms. Large deficits apparently imply strong claims on the budget and, hence, generate unwillingness to impose self-discipline. As such, countries will tend to move either to small fiscal deficits and good institutions or large deficits and weak institutions. Economic shocks (if they are large enough) can help build a constituency for improving budget institut 410 0$aIMF Working Papers 606 $aBudget process$zEurope 606 $aBudget deficits$zEurope 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aBudget process 615 0$aBudget deficits 676 $a352.48 700 $aFabrizio$b Stefania$0888385 701 $aMody$b Ashoka$0888386 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910464004803321 996 $aBreaking the impediments to budgetary reforms$91984641 997 $aUNINA