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100   $a20041202d2009      uf             0
101 0 $aeng
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181   $ctxt
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183   $acr
200 10$aFiscal incentive effects of the German equalization system$b[electronic resource] /$fprepared by Sven Jari Stehn and Annalisa Fedelino
210   $a[Washington D.C.] $cInternational Monetary Fund$d2009
215   $a1 online resource (31 p.)
225 1 $aIMF working paper ;$vWP/09/124
300   $aDescription based upon print version of record.
311   $a1-4519-1700-7 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references.
327   $aContents; I. Introduction; II. Fiscal Discipline and Fiscal Transfers: A Difficult Nexus; Figures; 1. Subnational Shares in Total Spending and Revenue, 2006; 2. Comparative Composition of Subnational Revenue; A. Germany's Transfer System; 3. Net Contributing and Net Receiving La?nder; 4. Evolution of the Transfer System; B. Potential Implications of Transfers; 5. Debt by Government Level; 6: La?nder Debt; III. Framework, Methodology, and Data; A. The Inter-Temporal Budget Constraint; B. Cyclicality; C. Data; IV. Empirical Analysis; Tables; 1. Germany: Descriptive Statistics, 1985-2007
327   $aA. Univariate Analysis: Fiscal Reaction Functions2. Fiscal Behavior of the Old La?nder, 1985-2007; 3. Behavior of Primary Expenditure for La?nder, 1985-2007; 4. Robustness Check I: Behavior of Primary Expenditure for La?nder, 1985-2007; B. Multivariate Analysis: VARs; 5. Robustness Check II: Behavior of Primary Expenditure; 7. La?nder Behavior and Average Received Transfers, 1985-2007; 8. Output Gap Shock; V. Policy Implications and Conclusions; 9. Primary Spending Shock; Appendix I; Appendix Table 6: Unit root tests; References
330   $aDoes reliance on transfers weaken fiscal discipline and encourage pro-cyclical fiscal policies in recipient subnational governments? Using fiscal reaction functions for a panel of the German La?nder, this paper finds a positive answer to both questions. Net-recipient states (La?nder, benefiting from the transfer system) have not reduced primary expenditure significantly in response to rising deficits, but have instead relied on vertical transfers from the federal government to ensure debt sustainability. Moreover, they have pursued pro-cyclical policies, particularly by raising expenditures in g
410  0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/09/124.
606   $aIntergovernmental fiscal relations$zGermany
606   $aFiscal policy$zGermany
608   $aElectronic books.
615  0$aIntergovernmental fiscal relations
615  0$aFiscal policy
700   $aStehn$b Sven Jari$0901877
701   $aFedelino$b Annalisa$0880455
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910464004003321
996   $aFiscal incentive effects of the German equalization system$92234356
997   $aUNINA