LEADER 04470nam 2200697 450 001 9910464001603321 005 20170817212532.0 010 $a1-4623-4974-9 010 $a1-4527-7531-1 010 $a1-282-84084-3 010 $a9786612840845 010 $a1-4518-6991-6 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055036 035 $a(EBL)1607888 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001488815 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11842904 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001488815 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11445409 035 $a(PQKB)10863402 035 $a(OCoLC)276784452 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1607888 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055036 100 $a20140226h20082008 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aWhy do countries peg the way they peg? $ethe determinants of anchor currency choice /$fChristopher M. Meissner and Nienke Oomes ; authorized for distribution by Marta Castello-Branco 210 1$a[Washington, District of Columbia] :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2008. 210 4$dİ2008 215 $a1 online resource (47 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 225 0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/08/132 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4519-1444-X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aContents; I. Introduction; II. The Evolution of Anchor Currency Choice; A. Measuring Anchor Currency Choice; B. Stylized Facts on Anchor Currency Choice; Figures; 1. All Countries: Anchor Currency Choices, 1950-2001; 2. Developed Countries: Anchor Currency Choices, 1950-2001; 3. Developing Countries: Anchor Currency Choices, 1950-2001; 4. Transition Countries: Anchor Currency Choices, 1990-2001; C. Why Countries Peg the Way They Peg: A Brief Survey of Recent Experience; III. Conceptual Framework for Anchor Choice: Network Externalities, Multiple Equilibria, and Path Dependence; Tables 327 $a1. Initial Payoff Matrix2. Subsequent Payoff Matrix; IV. Empirical Methodology; V. Empirical Determinants of Anchor and Regime Choice; A. Country-Specific Determinants of Anchor Currency Choice; B. Country-Specific Determinants of Regime Choice: Pegs vs. Floats; C. Anchor-Specific Determinants of Anchor Currency Choice; VI. Results; A. Determinants of Anchor Currency Choice; 3. Determinants of Anchor and Exchange Rate Regime Choice, 1990-1998; 4. Determinants of Anchor and Exchange Rate Regime Choice, 1980-1998; B. How Strong Are Network Externalities 327 $a5. Actual and Predicted Number of Dollar Anchors, 1990-19986. Actual and Predicted Number of German Mark Anchors, 1990-1998; C. Other Determinants of Anchor Choice; D. Determinants of Regime Choice: Pegs vs. Floats; E. Model Fit; F. Other Specifications and Robustness Checks; 5. Determinants of Anchor Choice, Restricted Choice Set, 1980-1998; 6. Determinants of Anchor Choice, Restricted Choice Set, 1998; G. Other Factors that Appear Less Relevant or Are Hard to Test; VII. Conclusion; Appendixes; I. The Natural Classification 327 $aII. A Model of Trade Network Externalities in Anchor Currency ChoiceReferences 330 $aWhat determines the currency to which countries peg or ""anchor"" their exchange rate? Data for over 100 countries between 1980 and 1998 reveal that trade network externalities are a key determinant. This implies that anchor currency choice may well be suboptimal in that certain currencies, e.g., the U.S. dollar, could be oversubscribed. It also implies that changes in anchor choices by a small number of countries can have large and rapid effects on the international monetary system. Other factors found to be related to anchor choice include the symmetry of output shocks and the currency denom 410 0$aIMF Working Papers 606 $aForeign exchange rates 606 $aForeign exchange administration 606 $aCoinage, International 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aForeign exchange rates. 615 0$aForeign exchange administration. 615 0$aCoinage, International. 676 $a332.45 700 $aOomes$b Nienke$0862704 701 $aOomes$b Nienke$0862704 701 $aCastello-Branco$b Marta$0894052 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910464001603321 996 $aWhy do countries peg the way they peg$92073991 997 $aUNINA