LEADER 03303nam 2200613Ia 450 001 9910463998703321 005 20181115205228.0 010 $a1-4623-8907-4 010 $a1-4527-0567-4 010 $a9786612843273 010 $a1-4518-7259-3 010 $a1-282-84327-3 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055270 035 $a(EBL)1608303 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000940042 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11483766 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000940042 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10946570 035 $a(PQKB)10050560 035 $a(OCoLC)649718522 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1608303 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055270 100 $a20100902d2009 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 13$aAn alternative explanation for the resource curse$b[electronic resource] $ethe income effect channel /$fAli Alichi and Rabah Arezki 210 $a[Washington, D.C.] $cInternational Monetary Fund$d2009 215 $a1 online resource (26 p.) 225 1 $aIMF working paper ;$vWP/09/112 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4519-1689-2 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aContents; I. Introduction; Tables; 1. Composition of Government Expenditures in Oil Exporting; II. A Simple Model; A. Closed Economy; Figures; 1. Non-Hydrocarbon GDP Growth and Government Current Spending; 2. Transition Paths; B. Openness and Resource Curse; C. Altruism and Resource Curse; III. Empirical Investigation; A. Empirical Methodology; 3. Resource Curse Channels; B. Results; 2. Growth Regressions; IV. Conclusion; 3. Growth Regressions using Restrictions on Trade and Capital Flows; References; Appendices; A. Data; Appendix Tables; 4. Data Description; 5. Descriptive Statistics 327 $a6. List of Countries Included in the Sample B. Testing for Whether a Higher Degree of Altruism Dampens the Adverse Effect of Government Current Spending on Non-Hydrocarbon GDP Growth; 7. Growth Regressions using Regional Dummies; C. Regional integration of two large open economies 330 $aThe paper provides an alternative explanation for the ""resource curse"" based on the income effect resulting from high government current spending in resource rich economies. Using a simple life cycle framework, we show that private investment in the non-resource sector is adversely affected if private agents expect extra government current spending financed through resource sector revenues in the future. This income channel of the resource curse is stronger for countries with lower degrees of openness and forward altruism. We empirically validate these findings by estimating non-hydrocarbon 410 0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/09/112. 606 $aResource curse 606 $aEconomic development 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aResource curse. 615 0$aEconomic development. 700 $aAlichi$b Ali$0876494 701 $aArezki$b Rabah$0936180 712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund. 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910463998703321 996 $aAn alternative explanation for the resource curse$92273580 997 $aUNINA