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101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|||||||||||
181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
182   $cc$2rdamedia
183   $acr$2rdacarrier
200 10$aPolitical institutions and party-directed corruption in South America $estealing for the team /$fDaniel W. Gingerich, University of Virginia$b[electronic resource]
210  1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2013.
215   $a1 online resource (xviii, 282 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s)
225 1 $aPolitical economy of institutions and decisions
300   $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
311   $a1-107-65609-5 
311   $a1-107-04044-2 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
327   $a1. Institutions and political corruption: a framework -- 2. Institutional design and the case for mechanism-based analysis -- 3. Ballot structure, political corruption, and the performance of proportional representation -- 4. An approach to overcoming the fundamental problem of inference in corruption studies -- 5. Political career paths in the bureaucracy and the use of institutional resources in Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile -- 6. Conclusion.
330   $aAn important question for the health and longevity of democratic governance is how institutions may be fashioned to prevent electoral victors from drawing on the resources of the state to perpetuate themselves in power. This book addresses the issue by examining how the structure of electoral institutions - the rules of democratic contestation that determine the manner in which citizens choose their representatives - affects political corruption, defined as the abuse of state power or resources for campaign finance or party-building purposes. To this end, the book develops a novel theoretical framework that examines electoral institutions as a potential vehicle for political parties to exploit the state as a source of political finance. Hypotheses derived from this framework are assessed using an unprecedented public employees' survey conducted by the author in Bolivia, Brazil and Chile.
410  0$aPolitical economy of institutions and decisions.
517 3 $aPolitical Institutions & Party-Directed Corruption in South America
606   $aPolitical corruption$zSouth America$vCase studies
606   $aPolitical parties$zSouth America$vCase studies
606   $aPower (Social sciences)$zSouth America$vCase studies
615  0$aPolitical corruption
615  0$aPolitical parties
615  0$aPower (Social sciences)
676   $a364.1/323098
700   $aGingerich$b Daniel W.$f1977-$01039050
801  0$bUkCbUP
801  1$bUkCbUP
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910463961603321
996   $aPolitical institutions and party-directed corruption in South America$92460992
997   $aUNINA