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100   $a20100902d2009      uf             0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|n|---|||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aWho disciplines bank managers?$b[electronic resource] /$fMartin Ciha?k ... [et al.]
210   $a[Washington, D.C.] $cInternational Monetary Fund$d2009
215   $a1 online resource (76 p.)
225 1 $aIMF working paper ;$vWP/09/272
300   $aDescription based upon print version of record.
311   $a1-4519-1833-X 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references.
327   $aCover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Related Literature and Hypothesis; III. Methodology and Data; A. Methodology; B. Variable Selection; C. Dataset; 1. Histogram of Total Assets; 1. Descriptive Statistics, Differences of Means and Medians, and Correlations; IV. Bank Performance Prior to Executive Turnover; 2. Percentage Changes in Bank Performance Prior to Executive Turnover; V. Multivariate Analysis; 3. Conditional Logit Models for Different Sources of Discipine; 4. Key Variables of Interest by Percentile of Z-Score
327   $a5. Changes in Bank Performance After Executive Turnovers (Treatment Group)6. Changes in Bank Performance After Executive Turnovers (Treatment and Control Group); 7. Changes in Bank Performance After Executive Turnovers (Matching on Propensity Scores, Treatment, and Control Group; VI. Conclusions; I. Measuring Bank Soundness Using the Z-Score; II. Overview of Data and Sources; III. Turnovers in Small and Medium Sized U.S. Banks 1990-2007; IV. Robustness Checks; References; Footnotes
330   $aWe bring to bear a hand-collected dataset of executive turnovers in U.S. banks to test the efficacy of market discipline in a 'laboratory setting' by analyzing banks that are less likely to be subject to government support. Specifically, we focus on a new face of market discipline: stakeholders' ability to fire an executive. Using conditional logit regressions to examine the roles of debtholders, shareholders, and regulators in removing executives, we present novel evidence that executives are more likely to be dismissed if their bank is risky, incurs losses, cuts dividends, has a high charter
410  0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/09/272.
606   $aBanks and banking
606   $aCorporate governance
608   $aElectronic books.
615  0$aBanks and banking.
615  0$aCorporate governance.
700   $aC?iha?k$b Martin$0873075
712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund.
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910463721203321
996   $aWho disciplines bank managers$92064542
997   $aUNINA