LEADER 03673nam 2200709 450 001 9910463636103321 005 20170816134625.0 010 $a1-4623-3157-2 010 $a1-4527-0165-2 010 $a1-4518-7096-5 010 $a1-282-84189-0 010 $a9786612841897 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055128 035 $a(EBL)1608036 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000943300 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11524018 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943300 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10977406 035 $a(PQKB)10391005 035 $a(OCoLC)761832055 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1608036 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055128 100 $a20140226h20082008 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe costs of sovereign default /$fEduardo Borensztein and Ugo Panizza 210 1$a[Washington, District of Columbia] :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2008. 210 4$dİ2008 215 $a1 online resource (52 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 225 0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/08/238 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4519-1549-7 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aContents; I. Introduction; II. Two Hundred Years of Sovereign Default; III. Default and GDP Growth; IV. Default and Reputation; V. Default and International Trade; VI. Default and the Domestic Banking System; VII. Political Implications of Default; VIII. Conclusions; References; Figures; 1. Number of Defaults (1824-2004); Tables; 1. Default Episodes; 2. Default and Growth, Panel 1972-2000; 3. Default and Growth, Panel 1972-2000; 4. Default and Credit Ratings, Cross Section Regression, 1999-2002; 5. Defaults and Bond Spreads, Panel Regression, 1997-2004; 6. Default and Trade Credit 327 $a7. Default and Trade: Does Trade Credit Matter?8. Probabilities of Default and Banking Crisis; 9. Default and Industry Value-Added Growth; 10. Defaults and Elections; 11. Type of Default; 12. Type of Default and Government; Appendix Tables; A1. Private Lending to Sovereign. Default and Rescheduling; A2: Logit Model for the Probability of Default 330 $aThis paper evaluates empirically four types of cost that may result from an international sovereign default: reputational costs, international trade exclusion costs, costs to the domestic economy through the financial system, and political costs to the authorities. It finds that the economic costs are generally significant but short-lived, and sometimes do not operate through conventional channels. The political consequences of a debt crisis, by contrast, seem to be particularly dire for incumbent governments and finance ministers, broadly in line with what happens in currency crises. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers 606 $aDebts, External$xEconometric models 606 $aDefault (Finance)$xEconometric models 606 $aDebts, Public 606 $aFinancial crises$xEconometric models 606 $aBank failures$xEconometric models 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aDebts, External$xEconometric models. 615 0$aDefault (Finance)$xEconometric models. 615 0$aDebts, Public. 615 0$aFinancial crises$xEconometric models. 615 0$aBank failures$xEconometric models. 676 $a336.3435 700 $aBorensztein$b Eduardo$0858680 701 $aPanizza$b Ugo$0873343 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910463636103321 996 $aThe costs of sovereign default$91952259 997 $aUNINA