LEADER 03349nam 2200613 450 001 9910463632803321 005 20170815101930.0 010 $a1-4623-4873-4 010 $a1-4527-2990-5 010 $a1-4518-7046-9 010 $a9786612841392 010 $a1-282-84139-4 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055087 035 $a(EBL)1607971 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000944149 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11506473 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000944149 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10982921 035 $a(PQKB)10621924 035 $a(OCoLC)761918279 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1607971 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055087 100 $a20140227h20082008 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aInnovation in banking and excessive loan growth /$fDaniel C. Hardy and Alexander F. Tieman 210 1$a[Washington, District of Columbia] :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2008. 210 4$dİ2008 215 $a1 online resource (30 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 225 0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/08/188 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4519-1499-7 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aContents; I. Introduction; Figures; 1. Change in the ratio of credit to GDP, 2003-2007; II. The Model; Tables; 1. Expected Payoffs in Different States; III. Model Analysis; A. Full Information; B. Equilibria with Partial Information and Two Bank Types; Pooling; Separating; A parameterized example; C. Separating Equilibrium with Partial Information and a Continuum of Bank Types; 2. The Value Function for Different Types: Separating Equilibrium; IV. Extensions; A. Investment in Loan Technology; 3. Credit Volumes and Bank Characteristics for a Continuum of Types 327 $a2. Investment Decision Starting From and Ending at Pooling EquilibriaB. Pervasive Moral Hazard and Low-Credit Outcomes; 3. Investment Decision Starting From and Ending at Separating Equilibria; 4. Separating Equilibrium with Low Credit Volume; V. Summary and Conclusions; 5. Pooling Equilibrium with Low Credit Volume; References; Appendix; I: Expected Loan Losses in a Pooling Equilibrium; II: Regularity Conditions on the Objective Function with a Continuum of Bank Types 330 $aThe volume of credit extended by a bank can be an informative signal of its abilities in loan selection and management. It is shown that, under asymmetric information, banks may therefore rationally lend more than they would otherwise in order to demonstrate their quality, thus negatively affecting financial system soundness. Small shifts in technology and uncertainty associated with new technology may lead to large jumps in equilibrium outcomes. Prudential measures and supervision are therefore warranted. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers 606 $aBank loans$xEconometric models 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aBank loans$xEconometric models. 676 $a332.1753 700 $aHardy$b Daniel C$0860312 701 $aTieman$b Alexander F$0860313 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910463632803321 996 $aInnovation in banking and excessive loan growth$91919630 997 $aUNINA