LEADER 03740nam 2200709 450 001 9910463617903321 005 20180828010807.0 010 $a1-4623-5881-0 010 $a1-4527-4907-8 010 $a9786612841996 010 $a1-4518-7106-6 010 $a1-282-84199-8 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055144 035 $a(EBL)1608063 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000943980 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11612509 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943980 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10982471 035 $a(PQKB)10948551 035 $a(OCoLC)874177680 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1608063 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055144 100 $a20140227h20072007 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aBanks' precautionary capital and persistent credit crunches /$fFabian Valencia ; authorized for distribution by Antonio Furtado 210 1$a[Washington, District of Columbia] :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2007. 210 4$dİ2007 215 $a1 online resource (37 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 225 0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/08/248 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4519-1559-4 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aContents; I. Introduction; II. Banks and the Real Economy; III. The Model; A. The Loan Contract; B. The Bank's Optimization Problem; C. Solution; D. Risk and the Target Level of Solvency; IV. Quantitative Experiments; V. Bank Recapitalization; VI. Conclusions; Figures; 1. Bank Credit as Percentage of GDP, Selected Countries; 2. Optimal Policy Functions; 3. Target Level of Solvency; 4. Responses to a Negative Transitory Productivity Shock; 5. Responses to an Interest Rate Increase; 6. Responses to a Large Negative Shock, With and Without Recapitalization 327 $a7. Credit Crunch Severity and Bank Recapitalization Tables; 1. Bank's Sequence of Events; 2. Public Recapitalization Costs for Selected Crises Episodes; 3. Sensitivity Analysis to a 2-? Productivity Shock; 4. Bank's Solvency Regions; Appendix; 8. Deposit Interest Rate; References 330 $aPeriods of banking distress are often followed by sizable and long-lasting contractions in bank credit. They may be explained by a declined demand by financially impaired borrowers (the conventional financial accelerator) or by lower supply by capital-constrained banks, a ""credit crunch"". This paper develops a bank model to study credit crunches and their real effects. In this model, banks maintain a precautionary level of capital that serves as a smoothing mechanism to avert disruptions in the supply of credit when hit by small shocks. However, for larger shocks, highly persistent credit 410 0$aIMF Working Papers 606 $aFinancial crises$zUnited States$xEconometric models 606 $aBank capital$zUnited States$xEconometric models 606 $aBank failures$zUnited States$xEconometric models 606 $aCredit$zUnited States$xEconometric models 606 $aRisk$zUnited States$xEconometric models 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aFinancial crises$xEconometric models. 615 0$aBank capital$xEconometric models. 615 0$aBank failures$xEconometric models. 615 0$aCredit$xEconometric models. 615 0$aRisk$xEconometric models. 676 $a330.973 700 $aValencia$b Fabian$0910645 701 $aFurtado$b Antonio$0928682 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910463617903321 996 $aBanks' precautionary capital and persistent credit crunches$92250233 997 $aUNINA