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101 0 $aeng
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181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aFinancial supervisory independence and accountability$b[electronic resource] $eexploring the determinants /$fprepared by Donato Masciandaro, Marc Quintyn, and Michael Taylor
210   $aWashington, D.C. $cInternational Monetary Fund $cIMF Institute$d2008
215   $a1 online resource (36 p.)
225 1 $aIMF working paper ;$vWP/08/147
300   $a"June 2008."
311   $a1-4519-1458-X 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 31-34).
327   $aContents; I. Introduction; II. Background; III. Analysis of Independence and Accountability Indices; A. Sample and Methodology; B. Main Findings; Tables; 1. Ratings on Supervisory Independence and Accountability, and on Independence in Monetary Policy; Figures; 1. Scatter Plot of Independence and Accountabilty Ratings; C. A Look into the Individual Criteria; 2. Spread Between Independence and Accountability Ratings; D. Location Has an Impact; 2. Governance Ratings by Location of Supervisor and Standard Deviation of Ratings in Italics; IV. The determinants of supervisory governance
327   $aA. The Econometric ApproachB. Model to be Tested; C. The Results; 3. Ordered Logit Estimates with Total Governance as the Dependent Variable; 4. Ordered Logit Estimates with Independence as the Dependent Variable; 5. Ordered Logit Estimates with Accountability as the Dependent Variable; V. Conclusions; Appendixes; I. Countries Selected for the Survey; II. Ratings by Criteria Across the Sample; III. Definition and Sources of Variables; IV. Correlation Matrix of Variables; References
330   $aWe analyze recent trends in, and determinants of, financial supervisory governance. We first calculate levels of supervisory independence and accountability in 55 countries. The econometric analysis of the determinants indicates that the quality of public sector governance plays a decisive role in establishing accountability arrangements, more than independence arrangements. It also shows that decisions regarding levels of independence and accountability are not well-connected. The results also show that the likelihood of establishing adequate governance arrangements are higher when the superv
410  0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/08/147.
606   $aFinance$xState supervision
606   $aBanks and banking, Central$xState supervision
608   $aElectronic books.
615  0$aFinance$xState supervision.
615  0$aBanks and banking, Central$xState supervision.
700   $aMasciandaro$b Donato$f1961-$089517
701   $aQuintyn$b Marc$0247373
701   $aTaylor$b Michael$f1962-$0325091
712 02$aIMF Institute.
712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund.
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910463602603321
996   $aFinancial supervisory independence and accountability$92015879
997   $aUNINA