LEADER 04155nam 2200673 450 001 9910463601903321 005 20170817212540.0 010 $a1-4623-1443-0 010 $a1-4527-4000-3 010 $a1-282-84092-4 010 $a1-4518-6999-1 010 $a9786612840920 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055044 035 $a(EBL)1607898 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000944137 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11503325 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000944137 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10983369 035 $a(PQKB)10193867 035 $a(OCoLC)252901774 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1607898 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055044 100 $a20140225h20082008 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aHerd behavior in financial markets $ean experiment with financial market professionals /$fMarco Cipriani and Antonio Guarino 210 1$a[Washington, District of Columbia] :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2008. 210 4$dİ2008 215 $a1 online resource (30 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 225 0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/08/141 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4519-1452-0 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aContents; I. Introduction; A. Literature Review; II. The Theoreticalmodel; A. The model structure; B. Theoretical predictions; Figures; 1. Prices and Traders' Expectations after a History of Buys; III. The Experiment and the Experimental Design; A. The experiment; B. Experimental design: the two treatments; 2. Prices and Traders' Expectations after a History of Sells; 3. Prices and Traders' Expectations after a Sell Followed by a History of Buys; IV. Results: Rationality, Herding and Contrarian Behavior; A. Treatment I; Tables; 1. Average behavior in Treatment I 327 $a2. Cascade trading behavior in Treatment IB. Treatment II; 3. No trade in Treatment I; 4. Average behavior in Treatment II; V. Comparison with Previous Experimental Results; 5. Cascade trading behavior in Treatment II; 6. No trade in Treatment II; VI. Individual Behavior; 7. Percentage of decisions in accordance with the theoretical prediction at individual level.; VII. Conclusions; 8. Regressions of the level of rationality in the experiment on individual characteristics. P-values in parenthesis 327 $a9. Regression of subjects' payoff at the end of the experiment on individual characteristics. P-values in parenthesis10. Regressions of participants' proportion of herding, contrarianism and no trading on the trader's dummy. Herd 1 and Contrarian 1 refer to Treatment I. Herd 2 and Contrarian 2 refer to Treatment II. P-values in parenthesis; References 330 $aWe study herd behavior in a laboratory financial market with financial market professionals. We compare two treatments, one in which the price adjusts to the order flow so that herding should never occur, and one in which event uncertainty makes herding possible. In the first treatment, subjects herd seldom, in accordance with both the theory and previous experimental evidence on student subjects. A proportion of subjects, however, engage in contrarianism, something not accounted for by the theory. In the second treatment, the proportion of herding decisions increases, but not as much as theor 410 0$aIMF Working Papers 606 $aCapitalists and financiers$xPsychology$xEconometric models 606 $aInvestments$xDecision making$xEconometric models 606 $aCollective behavior$xEconometric models 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aCapitalists and financiers$xPsychology$xEconometric models. 615 0$aInvestments$xDecision making$xEconometric models. 615 0$aCollective behavior$xEconometric models. 676 $a330.12 700 $aCipriani$b Marco$0869956 701 $aGuarino$b Antonio$0305062 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910463601903321 996 $aHerd behavior in financial markets$91942255 997 $aUNINA