LEADER 03874nam 2200661Ia 450 001 9910463588103321 005 20170817212619.0 010 $a1-4623-6487-X 010 $a1-4527-2688-4 010 $a1-282-84110-6 010 $a9786612841101 010 $a1-4518-7017-5 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055056 035 $a(EBL)1607922 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000943052 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11492234 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943052 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10974821 035 $a(PQKB)11414424 035 $a(OCoLC)265896530 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1607922 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055056 100 $a20080915d2008 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aResolving a large contingent fiscal liability$b[electronic resource] $eEastern European experiences /$fprepared by Mark Flangan 210 $a[Washington, D.C.] $cInternational Monetary Fund, European Dept.$dc2008 215 $a1 online resource (42 p.) 225 1 $aIMF working paper ;$vWP/08/159 300 $a"June 2008." 311 $a1-4519-1470-9 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aContents; I. Introduction; Tables; 1. Recent European Cases of Large Off-Balance Sheet Liabilities; II. Design of a Settlement: Economic Considerations; A. Fiscal sustainability; Boxes; 1. The sustainable level of primary surplus; Figures; 1. Primary Surplus in Successful Episodes of Debt Regularization; 2. Settlement Structures for Large Contingent Fiscal Liabilities; B. Macroeconomic stability; 3. Structure of the Serbian Debt Settlement; 2. The Global Monetary and Fiscal Model; 2. Up-front Debt Shock; 3. Sensitivity Tests; 4. Debt Shock with Counter-Cyclical Fiscal Policy 327 $a5. Spread-out Debt Shock6. Debt Shock with All Offsets; 4. Debt Settlement Timing and Macroeconomic Conjuncture; III. Design of a Settlement: Technical Considerations; A. Administration; 5. Settling Large Contingent Fiscal Claims: Issues Raised; B. The staging of a settlement; 7. Timing of Debt Restitution and Macroeconomic Factors; C. The settlement technique; 3. Mutual Debt Settlements (Netting) in the CIS; D. The use of public assets in a settlement; IV. Application: Ukraine and the lost savings problem; 8. Ukraine: Distribution of Lost Savings Claims 327 $a9. Ukraine: Debt Shocks and Fiscal Sustainability10. Ukraine: Current Macroeconomic Situation; V. Conclusions; Appendix I. The GIMF Model Calibration; Appendix II. Ukraine: A Brief History of the Lost Savings; References 330 $aOn occasion, a government may find itself confronted with a need to address a large contingent or off balance sheet fiscal liability. Implementing a settlement raises issues of fiscal sustainability and macroeconomic stability. This paper surveys the key design issues, and draws lessons from recent Eastern European experience. It then considers in more detail the particular case of Ukraine, and how it might approach its own large contingent liability-the so-called lost savings-which at end-2007 amounted to as much as 18 percent of GDP. 410 0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/08/159. 606 $aDebts, Public$zEurope, Eastern 606 $aFiscal policy$zEurope, Eastern 606 $aDebts, Public$zUkraine 606 $aFiscal policy$zUkraine 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aDebts, Public 615 0$aFiscal policy 615 0$aDebts, Public 615 0$aFiscal policy 700 $aFlanagan$b Mark$g(Mark Joseph)$0967509 712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund.$bEuropean Dept. 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910463588103321 996 $aResolving a large contingent fiscal liability$92196647 997 $aUNINA