LEADER 03713nam 2200601 a 450 001 9910463355403321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a0-674-07068-2 010 $a0-674-06732-0 024 7 $a10.4159/harvard.9780674067325 035 $a(CKB)2670000000330039 035 $a(StDuBDS)AH25018186 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000803480 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11484503 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000803480 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10810561 035 $a(PQKB)11145699 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3301188 035 $a(DE-B1597)178053 035 $a(OCoLC)819330020 035 $a(OCoLC)840437326 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780674067325 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3301188 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10642234 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000330039 100 $a20120229d2013 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe behavior of federal judges$b[electronic resource] $ea theoretical and empirical study of rational choice /$fLee Epstein, William M. Landes, Richard A. Posner 210 $aCambridge, Mass. $cHarvard University Press$d2013 215 $a1 online resource (xv, 422 p. ) $cill 300 $aFormerly CIP.$5Uk 311 $a0-674-04989-6 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aA realistic theory of judicial behavior -- The previous empirical literature -- The Supreme Court -- The Courts of Appeals -- The district courts and the selection effect -- Dissents and dissent aversion -- The questioning of lawyers at oral argument -- The auditioners. 330 $aJudges play a central role in the American legal system, but their behavior as decision makers is not well understood, even among themselves. The system permits judges to be quite secretive (and most of them are), so indirect methods are required to make sense of their behavior. Here, a political scientist, an economist, and a judge work together to construct a unified theory of judicial decision-making. Using statistical methods to test hypotheses, they dispel the mystery of how judicial decisions in district courts, circuit courts, and the Supreme Court are made. The authors derive their hypotheses from a labor-market model, which allows them to consider judges as they would any other economic actors: as self-interested individuals motivated by both the pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects of their work. In their view, this model describes judicial behavior better than either the traditional "legalist" theory, which sees judges as automatons who mechanically apply the law to the facts, or the current dominant theory in political science, which exaggerates the ideological component in judicial behavior. Ideology does figure into decision-making at all levels of the federal judiciary, the authors find, but its influence is not uniform. It diminishes as one moves down the judicial hierarchy from the Supreme Court to the courts of appeals to the district courts. As The Behavior of Federal Judges demonstrates, the good news is that ideology does not extinguish the influence of other components in judicial decision-making. Federal judges are not just robots or politicians in robes. 606 $aJudicial process$zUnited States 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aJudicial process 676 $a347.73/14 700 $aEpstein$b Lee$f1958-$0322967 701 $aLandes$b William M$0255156 701 $aPosner$b Richard A$0110175 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910463355403321 996 $aThe behavior of federal judges$92456359 997 $aUNINA