LEADER 03457nam 22006131 450 001 9910463041103321 005 20211214022402.0 010 $a0-300-15806-8 024 7 $a10.12987/9780300158069 035 $a(CKB)2670000000427045 035 $a(EBL)3421287 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001101353 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11642296 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001101353 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11066727 035 $a(PQKB)11174199 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3421287 035 $a(DE-B1597)485623 035 $a(OCoLC)858969108 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780300158069 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3421287 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10767070 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL521973 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000427045 100 $a20130924d1977 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurnn#---uu|uu 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aPrivate property and the Constitution /$fBruce A. Ackerman 210 1$aNew Haven :$cYale University Press,$d1977. 215 $a1 online resource (314 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 0 $a0-300-02237-9 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and indexes. 327 $tFront matter --$tContents --$tAcknowledgments --$t1. Two Directions for Legal Thought --$t2. Scientific Adjudication --$t3. Utilitarian Adjudication --$t4. Kantian Adjudication --$t5. Ordinary Adjudication --$t6. Layman's Things --$t7. On the Nature and Object of Legal Language --$tNotes --$tTable of Cases --$tIndex 330 $aThe proper construction of the compensation clause of the Constitution has emerged as the central legal issue of the environmental revolution, as property owners have challenged a steady stream of environmental statutes that have cut deeply into traditional notions of property rights. When may they justly demand that the state compensate them for the sacrifices they are called upon to make for the common good? Ackerman argues that there is more at stake in the present wave of litigation than even the future shape of environmental law in the United States. To frame an adequate response, lawyers must come to terms with an analytic conflict that implicates the nature of modern legal thought itself. Ackerman expresses this conflict in terms of two opposed ideal types---Scientific Policymaking and Ordinary Observing---and sketches the very different way in which these competing approaches understand the compensation question. He also tries to demonstrate that the confusion of current compensation doctrine is a product of the legal profession's failure to choose between these two modes of legal analysis. He concludes by exploring the large implications of such a choice---relating the conflict between Scientific Policymaking and Ordinary Observing to fundamental issues in economic analysis, political theory, metaethics, and the philosophy of language. 606 $aConstitutional law$zUnited States 606 $aEminent domain$zUnited States 606 $aProperty$zUnited States 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aConstitutional law 615 0$aEminent domain 615 0$aProperty 676 $a343/.73/025 700 $aAckerman$b Bruce A$0123194 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910463041103321 996 $aPrivate Property and the Constitution$9988745 997 $aUNINA