LEADER 03897nam 22007092 450 001 9910462736103321 005 20151005020622.0 010 $a1-316-08996-7 010 $a1-139-56470-6 010 $a1-283-57518-3 010 $a1-139-17604-8 010 $a1-139-55116-7 010 $a9786613887634 010 $a1-139-55612-6 010 $a1-139-55242-2 010 $a1-139-54991-X 010 $a1-139-55487-5 010 $a9781139554879$b(electronic bk.) 035 $a(CKB)2670000000234799 035 $a(EBL)989169 035 $a(OCoLC)808501315 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000741667 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11466892 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000741667 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10721362 035 $a(PQKB)10232427 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9781139176040 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC989169 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL989169 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10591099 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL388763 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000234799 100 $a20111017d2012|||| uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 14$aThe politics of authoritarian rule /$fMilan W. Svolik, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign$b[electronic resource] 210 1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2012. 215 $a1 online resource (xviii, 228 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 225 1 $aCambridge studies in comparative politics 300 $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). 311 $a1-107-60745-0 311 $a1-107-02479-X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aMachine generated contents note: 1. Introduction: the anatomy of dictatorship; 2. The world of authoritarian politics; Part I. The Problem of Authoritarian Power-Sharing: 3. And then there was one!: Authoritarian power-sharing and the path to personal dictatorship; 4. Institutions, collective action, and the success of authoritarian power-sharing; Part II. The Problem of Authoritarian Control: 5. Moral hazard in authoritarian repression and the origins of military dictatorships; 6. Why authoritarian parties?: The regime party as an instrument of co-optation and control; 7. Conclusion: incentives and institutions in authoritarian politics. 330 $aWhat drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts. Dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule - the problem of authoritarian control. Secondly from the elites with whom dictators rule - the problem of authoritarian power-sharing. Using the tools of game theory, Svolik explains why some dictators establish personal autocracy and stay in power for decades; why elsewhere leadership changes are regular and institutionalized, as in contemporary China; why some dictatorships are ruled by soldiers, as Uganda was under Idi Amin; why many authoritarian regimes, such as PRI-era Mexico, maintain regime-sanctioned political parties; and why a country's authoritarian past casts a long shadow over its prospects for democracy, as the unfolding events of the Arab Spring reveal. Svolik complements these and other historical case studies with the statistical analysis on institutions, leaders and ruling coalitions across dictatorships from 1946 to 2008. 410 0$aCambridge studies in comparative politics. 606 $aAuthoritarianism 606 $aAuthoritarianism$vCase studies 615 0$aAuthoritarianism. 615 0$aAuthoritarianism 676 $a320.53 686 $a04.08.88$2EP-CLASS 700 $aSvolik$b Milan W.$f1977-$0894382 801 0$bUkCbUP 801 1$bUkCbUP 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910462736103321 996 $aThe politics of authoritarian rule$91998098 997 $aUNINA