LEADER 03796nam 2200661Ia 450 001 9910462595303321 005 20211029021145.0 010 $a1-283-95032-4 010 $a0-300-15810-6 024 7 $a10.12987/9780300158106 035 $a(CKB)2670000000330651 035 $a(EBL)3421109 035 $a(OCoLC)923601941 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001073552 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11600513 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001073552 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11164741 035 $a(PQKB)11043849 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3421109 035 $a(DE-B1597)485637 035 $a(OCoLC)1043360168 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780300158106 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3421109 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10645464 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL426282 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000330651 100 $a19911023d1992 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurnn#---|u||u 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aWar and reason$b[electronic resource] $edomestic and international imperatives /$fBruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman 210 $aNew Haven $cYale University Press$dc1992 215 $a1 online resource (336 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 0 $a0-300-05202-2 311 0 $a0-300-05922-1 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 307-314) and index. 327 $tFront matter --$tContents --$tFigures --$tTables --$tPreface --$tChapter 1. Reason and War --$tChapter 2. The International Interaction Game --$tChapter 3. Foreign Policy Decisions with Full Information --$tChapter 4. Norms, Beliefs, and International Cooperation --$tChapter 5. Five Democratic Puzzles --$tChapter 6. International Power Relations and War --$tChapter 7. The Seven Weeks' War and System Transformation --$tChapter 8. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World --$tChapter 9. War's Reason and the National Interest --$tAppendix 1. Measurement of the Variables --$tAppendix 2. Domestic Constraints and the Prospects of Bluffing --$tBibliography --$tIndex 330 $aIn this landmark work, two leading theorists of international relations analyze the strategies designed to avoid international conflict. Using a combination of game theory, statistical analysis, and detailed case histories, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman evaluate the conditions that promote negotiation, the status quo, capitulation, acquiescence, and war. The authors assess two competing theories on the role that domestic politics plays in foreign policy choices: one states that national decision makers are constrained only by the exigencies of the international system, and the other views leaders as additionally constrained by domestic political considerations. Finding the second theory to be more consistent with historical events, they use it to examine enduring puzzles such as why democracies do not appear to fight one another, whether balance of power or power preponderance promotes peaceful resolution of disputes, and what conditions are necessary and sufficient for nations to cooperate with one another. They conclude by speculating about the implications of their theory for foreign policy strategies in the post-Cold War world. 606 $aInternational relations 606 $aBalance of power 606 $aWar (International law) 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aInternational relations. 615 0$aBalance of power. 615 0$aWar (International law) 676 $a327.1 700 $aBueno de Mesquita$b Bruce$f1946-$0712858 701 $aLalman$b David$01042371 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910462595303321 996 $aWar and reason$92466567 997 $aUNINA