LEADER 03409nam  2200625 a 450 
001 9910462588403321
005 20210108134450.0
010   $a0-19-991473-7
035   $a(CKB)2670000000357800
035   $a(StDuBDS)AH25228591
035   $a(SSID)ssj0000886422
035   $a(PQKBManifestationID)12318058
035   $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000886422
035   $a(PQKBWorkID)10818031
035   $a(PQKB)11107341
035   $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3055314
035   $a(EXLCZ)992670000000357800
100   $a20121213d2013      fy|            0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|||||||||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aNaturalism and the first-person perspective$b[electronic resource] /$fLynne Rudder Baker
210   $aNew York, NY $cOxford University Press$d[2013]
215   $a1 online resource (xxiv, 248 pages)
300   $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
311   $a0-19-991474-5 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
330 8 $aThis text investigates the limits of scientific naturalism. It has three goals: to show that no wholly impersonal account of reality can be adequate to all phenomena; to formulate a non-Cartesian account of the first-person perspective; to develop a 'near-naturalism' that accommodates the world of our encounters and interactions.$bScience and its philosophical companion, Naturalism, represent reality in wholly nonpersonal terms. How, if at all, can a nonpersonal scheme accommodate the first-person perspective that we all enjoy? In this volume, Lynne Rudder Baker explores that question by considering both reductive and eliminative approaches to the first-person perspective. After finding both approaches wanting, she mounts an original constructive argument to show that a nonCartesian first-personperspective belongs in the basic inventory of what exists. That is, the world that contains us persons is irreducibly personal.After arguing for the irreducibilty and ineliminability of the first-person perspective, Baker develops a theory of this perspective. The first-person perspective has two stages, rudimentary and robust. Human infants and nonhuman animals with consciousness and intentionality have rudimentary first-person perspectives. In learning a language, a person acquires a robust first-person perspective: the capacity to conceive of oneself as oneself, in the first person. By developing an account ofpersonal identity, Baker argues that her theory is coherent, and she shows various ways in which first-person perspectives contribute to reality.
606   $aNaturalism
606   $aSelf (Philosophy)
606   $aPerspective (Philosophy)
606   $aPhilosophy$2ukslc
606   $aNaturalism
606   $aPhilosophy & Religion$2HILCC
606   $aPhilosophy$2HILCC
608   $aElectronic books.$2lcsh
615  0$aNaturalism.
615  0$aSelf (Philosophy)
615  0$aPerspective (Philosophy)
615  7$aPhilosophy.
615  0$aNaturalism
615  7$aPhilosophy & Religion
615  7$aPhilosophy
676   $a146
700   $aBaker$b Lynne Rudder$f1944-2017,$0996614
801  0$bStDuBDS
801  1$bStDuBDS
801  2$bStDuBDSZ
801  2$bUkPrAHLS
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910462588403321
996   $aNaturalism and the first-person perspective$92285006
997   $aUNINA

LEADER 01250nas  2200373 a 450 
001 996209339103316
005 20240413020452.0
011   $a1941-0492
035   $a(OCoLC)44608446
035   $a(CKB)954925607862
035   $a(CONSER)  2008212919
035   $a(DE-599)ZDB2034755-8
035   $a(EXLCZ)99954925607862
100   $a20000718b19962012  sy         a
101 0 $aeng
135   $aurcn||||||
181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
182   $cc$2rdamedia
183   $acr$2rdacarrier
200 10$aIEEE transactions on systems, man, and cybernetics$hPart B$iCybernetics $ea publication of the IEEE Systems, Man, and Cybernetics Society
210   $aNew York, NY $cInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers$dc1996-2012
300   $aRefereed/Peer-reviewed
311   $a1083-4419 
606   $aCybernetics$vPeriodicals
606   $aCyberne?tique$xPe?riodiques
615  0$aCybernetics
615  6$aCyberne?tique$xPe?riodiques.
676   $a003/.5
712 02$aInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.
712 02$aIEEE Systems, Man, and Cybernetics Society.
906   $aJOURNAL
912   $a996209339103316
996   $aIEEE transactions on systems, man and cybernetics$9793089
997   $aUNISA