LEADER 03720nam 2200613 a 450 001 9910462031603321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-4639-8626-2 010 $a1-4639-4952-9 010 $a1-4639-4099-8 035 $a(CKB)2670000000184980 035 $a(EBL)1606540 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000941791 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11498812 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000941791 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10964434 035 $a(PQKB)11233022 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1606540 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1606540 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10553701 035 $a(OCoLC)870244936 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000184980 100 $a20120503d2012 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aBank funding structures and risk$b[electronic resource] $eevidence from the global financial crisis /$fFrancisco Vazquez and Pablo Federico 210 $aWashington, D.C. $cInternational Monetary Fund$d2012 215 $a1 online resource (35 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4639-3314-2 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aCover; Abstract; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Related Literature and Empirical Hypotheses; III. Data and Target Variables; A. Indicators of Bank Liquidity and Leverage; B. Global Banks Versus Domestic Banks; C. Bank Failure; IV. Empirical Approach and Quantitative Results; A. Stylized Facts; B. Baseline Regressions; C. Are There Threshold Effects at Play?; D. Are There Differences Across Bank Types?; V. Robustness Check; VI. Concluding Remarks; VII. References; Figures; 1. Evolution of Structural Liquidity and Leverage Before the Crisis, 2001-07 327 $a2. Evolution of Structural Liquidity and Leverage by Failed and Non-Failed Banks3. Distributions of Pre-Crisis Liquidity and Leverage across Failed and Non-Failed; Tables; 1. Stylized Balance-Sheet and Weights to Compute the NSFR; 2. Sample Coverage by Region and Type; 3. Summary Statistics of Selected Variables, 2001-07; 4. Pairwise Correlations Between Selected Variables, 2001-07; 5. Baseline Regressions; 6. Estimates of the Marginal Impact on the Probabilities of Default; 7. Probit Regressions by Sub-Samples of Liquidity and Leverage; 8. Regressions by Bank Types 327 $a9. Results of Robustness Checks by Alternative Definitions of Liquidity and CapitalTable 10. Results of Robustness Checks by Sub-Components of Bank Failure 330 $aThis paper analyzes the evolution of bank funding structures in the run up to the global financial crisis and studies the implications for financial stability, exploiting a bank-level dataset that covers about 11,000 banks in the U.S. and Europe during 2001?09. The results show that banks with weaker structural liquidity and higher leverage in the pre-crisis period were more likely to fail afterward. The likelihood of bank failure also increases with bank risk-taking. In the cross-section, the smaller domestically-oriented banks were relatively more vulnerable to liquidity risk, while the larg 410 0$aIMF Working Papers 606 $aGlobal Financial Crisis, 2008-2009 606 $aBank failures$zDeveloped countries 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aGlobal Financial Crisis, 2008-2009. 615 0$aBank failures 700 $aVa?zquez$b Francisco F$0854735 701 $aFederico$b Pablo$0854736 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910462031603321 996 $aBank funding structures and risk$91908559 997 $aUNINA