LEADER 03255nam 2200601Ia 450 001 9910461981703321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-4755-2021-2 010 $a1-4755-3924-X 035 $a(CKB)2670000000278823 035 $a(EBL)1606936 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000949374 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11521999 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000949374 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10996015 035 $a(PQKB)10526840 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1606936 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1606936 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10627044 035 $a(OCoLC)805985260 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000278823 100 $a20111102d2012 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aDonor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation $b[electronic resource] /$foprepared by Kurt Annen and Luc Moers 210 $aWashington, DC $cInternational Monetary Fund$d2012 215 $a1 online resource (38 p.) 225 0 $aIMF working paper ;$v12/204 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4755-5957-7 311 $a1-4755-0554-X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aCover; Contents; 1 Introduction; 2 Donor Coordination in Practice: Fragmentation; Figures; 1 Number of Recipient Countries and Global Aid Budget Shares; 2 Global Aid Herfindahl Index; 3 Background Literature; 4 Model; 4.1 Donors Maximize Net Aid Impact; 4.2 Donors Maximize Relative Net Aid Impact; 3 Best-Response Functions with Identical Donors; 4.3 Introducing Fixed Costs; 4 Best-Response Functions with Non-Identical Donors; 4.4 Introducing More Recipients and More Donors; 5 Empirical Evidence; Tables; 1 Larger Donors vs. Smaller Donors; 5 Herfindahl Index and Relative Donor Size 327 $a2 Donor Ranking in Aid Selectivity3 Donor Selectivity and Herfindahl Index; 6 Conclusion; References; Appendix A; Proof of Proposition 1; Description of Best-Response Functions; Proof of Proposition 4; Appendix B; Table 4: Donor Selectivity and MLD; Table 5: Donor Selectivity and Theil Index 330 $aThis paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors' budgets. The paper presents empirical evidence consistent with theoretical results. These imply that, short of ending donors' maximization of relative aid impact, agreements to better coordinate aid allocations are not implementable. Moreover, since policies to increase donor competition in terms of aid 410 0$aIMF Working Papers 606 $aEconomic assistance 606 $aFlow of funds 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aEconomic assistance. 615 0$aFlow of funds. 700 $aAnnen$b Kurt$f1967-$0956889 701 $aMoers$b Luc$0956890 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910461981703321 996 $aDonor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation$92167251 997 $aUNINA LEADER 01421nam 2200337 450 001 9910688310003321 005 20230623173357.0 035 $a(CKB)5400000000040619 035 $a(NjHacI)995400000000040619 035 $a(EXLCZ)995400000000040619 100 $a20230623d2021 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aEnvironmental Emissions /$fRichard Viskup 210 1$aLondon :$cIntechOpen,$d2021. 215 $a1 online resource (162 pages) 311 $a1-83968-512-3 330 $aToday, the issue of environmental emissions is more important than ever before. Air pollution with particulates, soot, carbon, aerosols, heavy metals, and so on is causing adverse effects on human health as well as the environment. This book presents new research and findings related to environmental emissions, pollution, and future sustainability. Written by experts in the field, chapters cover such topics as health effects, emission monitoring and mitigation, and emission composition and measurement. 606 $aAir quality management 615 0$aAir quality management. 676 $a363.7392 700 $aViskup$b Richard$01365230 801 0$bNjHacI 801 1$bNjHacl 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910688310003321 996 $aEnvironmental Emissions$93393147 997 $aUNINA