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100   $a20121206d2012      uy             0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aurcn|||||||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aBanking and trading$b[electronic resource] /$fArnoud W. A. Boot and Lev Ratnovski
210   $aWashington, D.C. $cInternational Monetary Fund$dc2012
215   $a1 online resource (49 p.)
225  0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/12/238
300   $aDescription based upon print version of record.
311   $a1-4755-1247-3 
311   $a1-4755-1121-3 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references.
327   $aCover; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Relationship to the Literature; III. Model; A. Approach; B. Credit Constraints; C. Banking; D. Trading; IV. Benefits of Conglomeration; V. Time Inconsistency of Capital Allocation; A. Setup: Long-term Banking; B. The Consequences of Time Inconsistency; C. Cost of Conglomeration under Time Inconsistency; VI. Trading as Risk-Shifting; A. Setup: Risky Trading; B. Risk-Shifting; C. The Interaction of Time Inconsistency and Risk Shifting; VII. Discussion; A. Front-loaded Income in Relationship Banking; B. External Equity and Internal Capital Allocation
327   $aC. Policy Implications VIII. Conclusion; References; Figures; 1. The Timeline; 2. The Timeline with Time Inconsistency; 3. Relationship Banking Allocation R as a Function of Trading Opportunities; 4. The Volume of Banking (R) and Trading (T), and Profits (?)under Conglomerated Banking; 5. The Volumes of Banking (R)and Trading (T), and Profits (?) with Risk-shifting; 6. Time Inconsistency Arises due to a Higher Return to Trading under Risk-shifting ("Effect 1"); 7. Risk-shifting Arises due to a Higher Volume of Trading, Driven by Time Inconsistency ("Effect 2")
330   $aWe study the effects of a bank's engagement in trading. Traditional banking is relationship-based: not scalable, long-term oriented, with high implicit capital, and low risk (thanks to the law of large numbers). Trading is transactions-based: scalable, shortterm, capital constrained, and with the ability to generate risk from concentrated positions. When a bank engages in trading, it can use its ?spare' capital to profitablity expand the sc
410  0$aIMF Working Papers
606   $aBanks and banking
606   $aStocks
608   $aElectronic books.
615  0$aBanks and banking.
615  0$aStocks.
700   $aBoot$b Arnoud W. A$g(Willem Alexander),$f1960-$0122541
701   $aRatnovski$b Lev$0895958
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910461975003321
996   $aBanking and trading$92001617
997   $aUNINA