LEADER 04096nam 2200649Ia 450 001 9910461863803321 005 20211102015245.0 010 $a0-674-07177-8 010 $a0-674-06771-1 024 7 $a10.4159/harvard.9780674067714 035 $a(CKB)2670000000273695 035 $a(StDuBDS)AH24437921 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000757001 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11467461 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000757001 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10754151 035 $a(PQKB)11487503 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3301150 035 $a(DE-B1597)177969 035 $a(OCoLC)815276603 035 $a(OCoLC)840440823 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780674067714 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3301150 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10614391 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000273695 100 $a20120403d2012 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aStrength in numbers$b[electronic resource] $ethe political power of weak interests /$fGunnar Trumbull 210 $aCambridge, Mass. $cHarvard University Press$d2012 215 $a1 online resource (256 p. )$cill 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 0 $a0-674-06641-3 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFront matter --$tContents --$tChapter 1. The Political Power of Weak Interests --$tChapter 2. Three Worlds of Consumer Protection --$tChapter 3. Consumer Mobilization in Postwar France --$tChapter 4. Interest Group Coalitions and Institutional Structures --$tChapter 5. Policy Narratives and Diffuse Interest Representation --$tChapter 6. The Limits of Regulatory Capture --$tChapter 7. The Limits of Lobbying --$tChapter 8. Coalitions and Collective Action --$tNotes --$tAcknowledgments --$tIndex 330 $aMany consumers feel powerless in the face of big industry's interests. And the dominant view of economic regulators (influenced by Mancur Olson's book The Logic of Collective Action, published in 1965) agrees with them. According to this view, diffuse interests like those of consumers are too difficult to organize and too weak to influence public policy, which is determined by the concentrated interests of industrial-strength players. Gunnar Trumbull makes the case that this view represents a misreading of both the historical record and the core logic of interest representation. Weak interests, he reveals, quite often emerge the victors in policy battles. Based on a cross-national set of empirical case studies focused on the consumer, retail, credit, pharmaceutical, and agricultural sectors, Strength in Numbers develops an alternative model of interest representation. The central challenge in influencing public policy, Trumbull argues, is not organization but legitimation. How do diffuse consumer groups convince legislators that their aims are more legitimate than industry's? By forging unlikely alliances among the main actors in the process: activists, industry, and regulators. Trumbull explains how these "legitimacy coalitions" form around narratives that tie their agenda to a broader public interest, such as expanded access to goods or protection against harm. Successful legitimizing tactics explain why industry has been less powerful than is commonly thought in shaping agricultural policy in Europe and pharmaceutical policy in the United States. In both instances, weak interests carried the day. 606 $aConsumer protection 606 $aTrade regulation 606 $aConsumption (Economics)$xPolitical aspects 606 $aConsumers$xPolitical activity 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aConsumer protection. 615 0$aTrade regulation. 615 0$aConsumption (Economics)$xPolitical aspects. 615 0$aConsumers$xPolitical activity. 676 $a381.3/4 700 $aTrumbull$b Gunnar$0959927 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910461863803321 996 $aStrength in numbers$92482228 997 $aUNINA