LEADER 05940nam 22007212 450 001 9910461584303321 005 20151014143835.0 010 $a1-139-23420-X 010 $a1-107-22504-3 010 $a1-280-39336-X 010 $a1-139-23269-X 010 $a9786613571281 010 $a1-139-04942-9 010 $a1-139-23046-8 010 $a1-139-22902-8 010 $a1-139-23347-5 010 $a1-139-23193-6 035 $a(CKB)2670000000177941 035 $a(EBL)866879 035 $a(OCoLC)793510852 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000631617 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11415163 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000631617 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10599717 035 $a(PQKB)11053466 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9781139049429 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC866879 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL866879 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10559488 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL357128 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000177941 100 $a20110307d2012|||| uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aAchieving nuclear ambitions $escientists, politicians and proliferation /$fJacques E. C. Hymans$b[electronic resource] 210 1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2012. 215 $a1 online resource (xii, 315 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 300 $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 08 Oct 2015). 311 $a0-521-13225-8 311 $a0-521-76700-8 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aCover; Achieving Nuclear Ambitions; Title; Copyright; Contents; Figures; Table; Preface; Abbreviations; 1 The puzzle of declining nuclear weapons project efficiency; The empirical puzzle of declining nuclear weapons project efficiency; The simple techno-centric perspective; More sophisticated techno-centric claims; The will to go nuclear; The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); Entangling alliances; Vulnerability to military threats; Economic resources; The argument of the book in brief; Core hypotheses; A preliminary empirical test 327 $aFrom state institutionalization to efficiency: a quantitative analysisFrom autonomy to efficiency: evidence from the first five nuclear weapon states; Bringing implementation back in; Road map; 2 A theory of nuclear weapons project efficiency and inefficiency; The micro level: management approach, worker motivation, and the functioning of nuclear weapons projects; The top-down model, or, how not to manage a nuclear weapons project; The bottom-up model, or, how to manage a nuclear weapons project; Summary: three hypotheses on management and proliferation 327 $aThe macro level: efficiency of nuclear weapons projects as a function of state institutionalizationDefining Weberian legal-rational and neo-patrimonial states; Weberian legal-rationalism's promotion of scientific and technical professionalism; Consequences of the "privileged" institutional status of nuclear programs; The special case of professional military-run nuclear weapons projects; Changing state institutionalization to create efficient nuclear weapons projects; The fate of nuclear programs in legal-rationalizing and neo-patrimonializing states; Summary of the basic causal arguments 327 $aInternational nuclear cooperation: a shortcut?Operationalization and case selection; 3 Spinning in place; Review of technical assessments of the pre-1991 Iraqi nuclear program; Pre-war estimates; The IAEA's estimate; Kelley's estimate; Explaining Iraq's nuclear inefficiency: management and institutions; Iraq's neo-patrimonial state; The Osiraq myth; 1981-1987: scientists in power?; 1987-1988: Hussein Kamel's power grab; Life under Kamel; 1990-1991: the crash program; "If the Gulf War had not intervened ...": questioning the premise of the counterfactual; After 1991: the Iraqi nuclear mirage 327 $aConclusion4 How did China's nuclear weapons project succeed?; China's nuclear success is a big social science puzzle; International deus ex machina?; Explaining China's nuclear success: three key variables; Unlimited political support; Strongly professional organization; Leadership self-restraint; Self-restraint or institutional constraint?; The importance of efficiency: a comparison of China's nuclear weapons project with its nuclear submarine project; Conclusion; 5 Proliferation implications of international civil nuclear cooperation:; Introduction: from domestic to international variables 327 $aAtoms for Peace's growing chorus of critics 330 $aDespite the global spread of nuclear hardware and knowledge, at least half of the nuclear weapons projects launched since 1970 have definitively failed, and even the successful projects have generally needed far more time than expected. To explain this puzzling slowdown in proliferation, Jacques E. C. Hymans focuses on the relations between politicians and scientific and technical workers in developing countries. By undermining the workers' spirit of professionalism, developing country rulers unintentionally thwart their own nuclear ambitions. Combining rich theoretical analysis, in-depth historical case studies of Iraq, China, Yugoslavia and Argentina and insightful analyses of current-day proliferant states, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions develops a powerful new perspective that effectively counters the widespread fears of a coming cascade of new nuclear powers. 606 $aNuclear weapons$zDeveloping countries 606 $aNuclear nonproliferation$zDeveloping countries 615 0$aNuclear weapons 615 0$aNuclear nonproliferation 676 $a623.4/5119091724 700 $aHymans$b Jacques E. C.$01055945 801 0$bUkCbUP 801 1$bUkCbUP 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910461584303321 996 $aAchieving nuclear ambitions$92489805 997 $aUNINA