LEADER 03814nam 22006732 450 001 9910461517003321 005 20160428162512.0 010 $a1-139-19936-6 010 $a1-107-22315-6 010 $a1-280-48424-1 010 $a9786613579225 010 $a1-139-20516-1 010 $a1-139-20297-9 010 $a1-139-20596-X 010 $a1-139-20156-5 010 $a1-139-20438-6 010 $a0-511-89463-5 035 $a(CKB)2670000000140265 035 $a(EBL)824418 035 $a(OCoLC)775869516 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000611827 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11369239 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000611827 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10667134 035 $a(PQKB)10537959 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9780511894633 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC824418 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL824418 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10533158 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL357922 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000140265 100 $a20101117d2012|||| uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 00$aEthical naturalism $ecurrent debates /$fedited by Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay$b[electronic resource] 210 1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2012. 215 $a1 online resource (viii, 262 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 300 $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). 311 $a1-107-67777-7 311 $a0-521-19242-0 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tIntroduction --$g1.$tNaturalism in moral philosophy /$rGilbert Harman --$g2.$tNormativity and reasons: five arguments from Parfit against normative naturalism /$rDavid Copp --$g3.$tNaturalism: feel the width /$rRoger Crisp --$g4.$tOn ethical naturalism and the philosophy of language /$rFrank Jackson --$g5.$tMetaethical pluralism: how both moral naturalism and moral skepticism may be permissible positions /$rRichard Joyce --$g6.$tMoral naturalism and categorical reasons /$rTerence Cuneo --$g7.$tDoes analytical moral naturalism rest on a mistake? /$rSusana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay --$g8.$tSupervenience and the nature of normativity /$rMichael Ridge --$g9.$tCan normativity be naturalized? /$rRobert Audi --$g10.$tEthical non-naturalism and experimental philosophy /$rRobert Shaver --$g11.$tExternalism, motivation, and moral knowledge /$rSergio Tenenbaum --$g12.$tNaturalism, absolutism, relativism /$rMichael Smith. 330 $aEthical naturalism is narrowly construed as the doctrine that there are moral properties and facts, at least some of which are natural properties and facts. Perhaps owing to its having faced, early on, intuitively forceful objections by eliminativists and non-naturalists, ethical naturalism has only recently become a central player in the debates about the status of moral properties and facts which have occupied philosophers over the last century. It has now become a driving force in those debates, one with sufficient resources to challenge not only eliminativism, especially in its various non-cognitivist forms, but also the most sophisticated versions of non-naturalism. This volume brings together twelve new essays which make it clear that, in light of recent developments in analytic philosophy and the social sciences, there are novel grounds for reassessing the doctrines at stake in these debates. 606 $aEthics, Evolutionary 606 $aNaturalism 615 0$aEthics, Evolutionary. 615 0$aNaturalism. 676 $a171/.2 702 $aNuccetelli$b Susana 702 $aSeay$b Gary 801 0$bUkCbUP 801 1$bUkCbUP 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910461517003321 996 $aEthical naturalism$92489804 997 $aUNINA