LEADER 03799nam 2200625 450 001 9910460435003321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a0-8047-9507-X 024 7 $a10.1515/9780804795074 035 $a(CKB)3710000000417948 035 $a(EBL)3568949 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001498621 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12562911 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001498621 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11507593 035 $a(PQKB)10843122 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0001103648 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3568949 035 $a(DE-B1597)564338 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780804795074 035 $a(OCoLC)1178768980 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000417948 100 $a20150620h20152015 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|nu---|u||u 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aCoercion, survival, and war $ewhy weak states resist the United States /$fPhil Haun 210 1$aStanford, California :$cStanford Security Studies,$d2015. 210 4$dİ2015 215 $a1 online resource (286 p.) 225 1 $aStanford security studies 300 $aIncludes index. 311 $a0-8047-9283-6 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFront matter --$tCONTENTS --$tList of Tables, Figures, and Maps --$tAcknowledgments --$t1. Introduction --$t2. A Theory of Asymmetric Interstate Coercion --$t3. Survival and Coercion Failure --$t4. The United States versus Iraq: The Gulf and Iraq Wars --$t5. The United States versus Serbia: Bosnia and Kosovo --$t6. The United States versus Libya: El Dorado Canyon, Pan Am Flight 103, and Weapons of Mass Destruction --$t7. Conclusion --$tAppendix A: Coding U.S. Cases of Asymmetric Coercion --$tAppendix B: Asymmetric Coercion Model --$tNotes --$tIndex 330 $aIn asymmetric interstate conflicts, great powers have the capability to coerce weak states by threatening their survival?but not vice versa. It is therefore the great power that decides whether to escalate a conflict into a crisis by adopting a coercive strategy. In practice, however, the coercive strategies of the U.S. have frequently failed. In Coercion, Survival and War Phil Haun chronicles 30 asymmetric interstate crises involving the US from 1918 to 2003. The U.S. chose coercive strategies in 23 of these cases, but coercion failed half of the time: most often because the more powerful U.S. made demands that threatened the very survival of the weak state, causing it to resist as long as it had the means to do so. It is an unfortunate paradox Haun notes that, where the U.S. may prefer brute force to coercion, these power asymmetries may well lead it to first attempt coercive strategies that are expected to fail in order to justify the war it desires. He concludes that, when coercion is preferred to brute force there are clear limits as to what can be demanded. In such cases, he suggests, U.S. policymakers can improve the chances of success by matching appropriate threats to demands, by including other great powers in the coercive process, and by reducing a weak state leader's reputational costs by giving him or her face-saving options. 410 0$aStanford security studies. 606 $aAsymmetric warfare$zUnited States$vCase studies 606 $aAsymmetric warfare$vCase studies 607 $aUnited States$xMilitary policy$vCase studies 607 $aUnited States$xForeign relations$vCase studies 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aAsymmetric warfare 615 0$aAsymmetric warfare 676 $a355.4/2 700 $aHaun$b Phil M.$01056873 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910460435003321 996 $aCoercion, survival, and war$92491556 997 $aUNINA