LEADER 03760nam 2200757 450 001 9910460357203321 005 20211018121937.0 010 $a0-231-53868-5 024 7 $a10.7312/fink16380 035 $a(CKB)3710000000267977 035 $a(EBL)1830698 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001368441 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12597594 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001368441 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11463377 035 $a(PQKB)10501752 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0001076045 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1830698 035 $a(DE-B1597)458319 035 $a(OCoLC)979745776 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780231538688 035 $a(PPN)201887975 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1830698 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10980762 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL686572 035 $a(OCoLC)894509132 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000267977 100 $a20141124h20152015 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|nu---|u||u 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aMoral hazard in health insurance $edevelopments since Arrow (1963) /$fAmy Finkelstein 210 1$aWest Sussex, England :$cColumbia University Press,$d2015. 210 4$dİ2015 215 $a1 online resource (161 p.) 225 1 $aKenneth J. Arrow Lecture Series 300 $aIncludes index. 311 $a1-322-55290-8 311 $a0-231-16380-0 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFront matter --$tContents --$tForeword /$rStiglitz, Joseph E. --$tIntroduction /$rNewhouse, Joseph P. --$tMoral Hazard in Health Insurance /$rFinkelstein, Amy --$tCommentary /$rGruber, Jonathan --$tCommentary /$rArrow, Kenneth J. --$tCommentary /$rStiglitz, Joseph E. --$tDiscussion --$tArrow (1963): Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care Notes On Contributors /$rArrow, Kenneth J. --$tNotes on Contributors --$tIndex 330 $aMoral hazard-the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others-is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow's seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein-recognized as one of the world's foremost experts on the topic-here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. 410 0$aKenneth J. Arrow lecture series (New York, N.Y.) 606 $aHealth insurance 606 $aMoral hazard 606 $aRisk (Insurance) 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aHealth insurance. 615 0$aMoral hazard. 615 0$aRisk (Insurance) 676 $a368.38/2 686 $aQX 710$2rvk 700 $aFinkelstein$b Amy$01026888 701 $aArrow$b Kenneth$0630451 701 $aGruber$b Jonathan$0145559 701 $aNewhouse$b Joseph$0145731 701 $aStiglitz$b Joseph E$0303847 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910460357203321 996 $aMoral hazard in health insurance$92442045 997 $aUNINA